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Abstract
Impeachment is a rather rare phenomenon, and thus is widely understudied.
Specifically, there is a lack of research regarding the ability of the news media to affect
public opinion toward impeachment. However, there is reason to believe the media plays
a significant role in shaping attitudes on impeachment: the media greatly influences the
general public and because elected officials are focused on re-election, they are inclined
to listen to the general public’s views regarding salient issues such as impeachment. This
independent study aims to holistically understand the implications of the media
influencing public opinion with regard to impeachment. I hypothesize that as a result of
either neutral or positive coverage, co-partisans of the President will hold positive
attitudes toward the President or his political party and against impeachment, while
members of the opposing party will continue to hold negative attitudes toward the
President and his party i.e. supporting impeachment. When partisan independents are
presented with neutral or positive coverage of an impeached president, I expect their
evaluations to remain consistent with the general public’s opinion. To evaluate my
hypotheses, I employ a comparative case study approach, specifically looking at
President Clinton’s 1998 impeachment and President Trump’s 2019 impeachment. I
combine content analysis of newspaper coverage with quantitative analyses of public
opinion during these impeachments. Through the content analysis and difference of
means tests, I find that there is in fact a relationship between polarization, media
coverage, and views towards impeachment, driven by the tenor of media coverage
throughout the various stages of the impeachment process.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
On Wednesday, January 13, 2021, President Donald J. Trump was impeached for
the second time by the United States House of Representatives. This time around, he was
impeached for “incitement of insurrection.” The House vote was 232-197: ten
Republicans crossed party lines by voting to impeach, while every Democrat voted in
support of impeachment (Kilgore 2021). On the contrary, with Trump’s first
impeachment in December 2019, zero Republicans voted in favor of impeachment, while
three Democrats sided with Republicans (Kilgore 2021). By February 13, 2021, Trump
was acquitted, and despite being impeached by the House twice, permitted to run for
office in the future (Kilgore 2021). With regard to Trump’s second impeachment, it was
much more evident via Twitter and his speech in Washington that he did in fact incite an
insurrection. Despite this, only ten Republicans crossed party lines. This is not a
coincidence. This is a result of increasing levels of polarization and negative partisanship,
which have been on the rise since the 1980’s (Mason 2018). Scholars have coined the
term “negative partisanship,” in reference to party member’s intense dislike of “the
other” political party. According to Liliana Mason (2018), people often dislike the other
party more than they like their own political party. But this drastic shift in our political
climate did not happen overnight.
The media has been extremely influential in the increase of polarization and
negative partisanship. The media frames issues in a partisan lens, which influences how
people think about certain issues. On a daily basis, the news media reinforces these
partisan norms, with certain media outlets coining themselves as conservative or liberal,
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allowing Americans to self-select into which news they hear, and how different
information is portrayed. For example, according to a Pew Research study, sixty-three
percent of Fox News regulars believed Trump’s response to COVID-19 was excellent
(Gramlich 2020). When MSNBC regulars were asked the same question, only two
percent believed his response was excellent (Gramlich 2020). However, looking at all
adults in the United States, this number is twenty-three percent (Gramlich 2020). This
issue of selective exposure is even worse with the use of Twitter and Facebook as news
sources, as people tend to follow other people with the same political beliefs. Selective
exposure is the idea that people opt-in to news-sources that re-affirm their partisan beliefs
(Stroud 2010, 557-558). Additionally, these sources as news sources are incredibly
problematic because there is no fact-checking on either platform, in addition to very few
barriers to what content people are able to share.
Because of these issues and the general ability of the media to frame public
opinion, I argue that impeachment attitudes are not simply a result of increasing
polarization and negative partisanship. In the case of Trump’s first impeachment, as well
as Bill Clinton’s impeachment in 1998, the media constantly reinforced these partisan
norms, further polarizing the country. Impeachment was framed as one party against the
other, regardless of the evidence presented throughout the impeachment inquiry. Rather
than focusing on the politics of impeachment, the media framed the issue to be
Democrats versus Republicans. It has become a series of attacks on “the other,” rather
than a means of institutional checks and balances intended by the Framers of the
Constitution.
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In support of this argument, I explore the following hypotheses: first, among copartisans, when the media’s tone is neutral or positive, negative partisanship will manifest
as positive attitudes toward the President and his political party; second, that among
opposing partisans, when the media’s tone is neutral or positive, negative partisanship
result in negative attitudes toward the President and his political party; finally, among
Independents, when the media’s tone is neutral or positive, evaluations of the President
will remain consistent with the general public’s opinion. In order to evaluate these
hypotheses, I conduct a comparative case study of the Clinton and Trump impeachments,
conducting a content analysis of The New York Times and The Washington Post to study
the media’s tone.
Chapter two synthesizes the existing literature regarding impeachment and the
media’s ability to frame issues and shape public opinion through its coverage. In
particular, I focus on polarization, negative partisanship, the media’s role in influencing
public opinion, and the media’s tone. This section is concluded with gaps in the literature
and expectations for my project. Chapter three begins with a Theory section, which
primarily focuses on negative partisanship and the media’s role in shaping public
opinion. Following this, my three hypotheses are further explained, along with my
research design and methodology. In chapter three, I also provide justification for my
case selection as well as my coding guidelines.
Chapter four involves a discussion and analysis of my findings in relation to my
hypotheses. Through conducting difference of means tests, I find general support for my
hypotheses regarding polarization, the media, and views towards impeachment. The
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media and how it chooses to frame impeachment has an effect on the attitudes of the
mass public toward either the impeached President or his political party, though these
results are contingent on individuals’ own partisan affiliation. Finally, in chapter five I
summarize my findings and their implications, as well as strengths and weaknesses of my
project. Last, I discuss areas for future research. At the end of this project there is an
Appendix, with all of my descriptive statistics, the results of my difference of means
tests, as well as sample articles and coding sheets, and my overall coding results.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
Since the Founding Fathers began discussing impeachment, there has been an
ongoing debate surrounding the topic (Sunstein 1998, 279). These issues include what
constitutes impeachment, how the impeachment process works, and the potential
outcomes of impeachment. Over time these issues have become clearer; however in the
Constitution the Framers left room for interpretation.
In regard to what constitutes grounds for impeachment, the Constitution states,
“Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors” (Sunstein 1998, 279). This
has been interpreted to mean that criminal violations are not necessary or sufficient for
impeachment (Sunstein 1998, 284). The terminology that the Founding Fathers used was
not by accident; “high” was intended to illustrate the seriousness of abuse of power
(Sunstein 1998, 285). This phrase leaves much up to interpretation, as “high crimes and
misdemeanors,” or abuse of power, can mean many different things to different
individuals or Congresses in general. Because of the vague, but carefully selected
language that the Founders used, Gerald Ford believed that “an impeachable offense ‘is
whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers [it] to be’” (Sunstein
1998, 282). Thus, there is really no set of exact guidelines for what constitutes
impeachment, but rather, impeachment is determined by what one branch of government
believes.
In fact, over the years, several other Presidents could, and maybe should have
been impeached (Sunstein 1998, 281). It was believed that President Reagan and
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President Bush were involved in unlawful acts surrounding the Iran-Contra Controversy
(Sunstein 1998, 296-297). President Roosevelt was accused of secret arms transports to
other countries (Sunstein 1998, 297). Eisenhower lied about a Soviet Union plane and
shipping arms to other countries (Sunstein 1998, 297). President Ford was suspected of
making a deal with President Nixon to pardon him (Sunstein 1998, 298). Similar to
Clinton, President Kennedy was accused of sexual relationships while in office (Sunstein
1998, 298). Finally, President Lincoln suspended the right of habeas corpus (Sunstein
1998, 298). However, none of these former Presidents were impeached. While this may
be in part due to lack of clarity in the Constitution, this may be due to lack of media
support for the impeachment of these Presidents, and thus, positive public perceptions of
these Presidents. Especially among recent Presidents on this list, lack of media and public
support was likely a factor, due to the growing media presence over the past several
decades. Because the media plays a crucial role in influencing public opinion, the media
may have saved these Presidents from impeachment. Similarly, due to their large
influence on the public, the media may have influenced the political context for those
Presidents that were impeached by the House.
Going back to Gerald Ford’s quote, the House ultimately decides what is an
impeachable offense, but the general, voting public plays a large role in any decision
made within the United States democratic system due to their influence in November.
This may explain why numerous former Presidents have not been impeached; the House
knew it was not favorable among the public, and thus did not call for impeachment.
Therefore, the public’s views can impact the turnout of impeachment proceedings, let
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alone any salient issue. This is because, at the end of the day, Members of Congress are
focused on getting re-elected to another term (Mayhew 1974). Thus, if a large portion of
their constituents are strongly against impeachment, it is likely that their vote will follow
suit, and vice versa. Therefore, could the fact that the two most recently impeached
presidents- Clinton and Trump- were acquitted by the Senate be due to public opinion,
which is ultimately shaped by negative partisanship and the mass media?

Role of Negative Partisanship
First, it is important to consider the impact of negative partisanship on public
opinion. Negative partisanship has been defined as the pattern of voting on the basis of
hostility towards the opposition party and their leaders (Abramowitz and McCoy 2018,
139). In fact, negative partisanship has become so strong that, “even weak partisans in the
U.S. now hold negative views of the out-party” (Bankert 2020, 3). Social identity theory
is the theoretical framework for understanding negative partisanship (Bankert 2020, 5).
This idea comes from the minimal group paradigm, illustrated in Henri Tajfel’s
experiment in the late 1960’s. In this experiment, Tajfel “found evidence of ingroup bias:
a preference for privileging of the ingroup over the outgroup” (Mason 2018, 11). Being
part of a group, regardless of how meaningful or meaningless the group is, ingroup
favoritism results: “Even when there is nothing to fight over, group members want to
win” (Mason 2018, 11). These same primal tendencies are found throughout American
politics (Mason 2018, 12). The outgroup is “the other” party, while the ingroup falls into
the same political party as the individual (Mason 2018). Mason argues that “according to
social identity theory, group members, at a very primal level, are powerfully motivated to
see outgroups as different from them and to view the world through a competitive lens,
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with importance placed on their own group’s superiority” (Mason 2018, 49). Mason
believes that Democrats and Republicans “dislike, even loathe” each other, due to their
group’s identity (Mason 2018, 47). In fact, differing policy opinions plays a very small
role in this partisan “loathing” (Mason 2018, 47). Policy disagreement alone cannot
explain the extent that partisans loathe one another (Mason 2018, 50). Today, the parties
primary concern is winning (Mason 2018, 48). Policy results are not the main concern for
average partisans, while winning is (Mason 2018, 54). Additionally, politics is not the
only thing dividing the parties: “The American political parties are growing socially
polarized. Religion, race, as well as class, geography, and culture are dividing the parties
in such a way that the effect of party identity is magnified” (Mason 2018, 14). Thus,
when dealing with many political issues, politics are not the only lens through which
these issues are examined.
This idea of negative partisanship has been on the rise since the 1980s. In 1980,
an average of 75% of Democrats and Republicans combined consistently voted for their
party. Between the 2004 and 2012 elections, this number rises to an average of 90%,
which is a rather significant increase (Abramowitz and Webster 2016, 14). Additionally,
in 2016, voters gave their own party an average rating of sixty-two degrees, and the
opposing party and average rating of twenty-three degrees on a feeling- thermometer
scale ranging from zero to one-hundred (Abramowitz and Webster 2018, 122). In fact,
partisan voting in general increased significantly between the 1970s and 2000s, with the
number of strong partisan identifiers (Mason 2018, 46). Between 2008 and 2012, the
country’s feelings towards the political parties became increasingly polarized, while
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policy attitudes stayed constant (Mason 2018, 52). As illustrated in the 2018
congressional elections, Democrats and Republicans dislike the opposing party more than
they like their own party (Abramowitz and Webster 2018, 122). Voters would prefer to
vote for a candidate from their own party that they are not totally confident in, than vote
for the other party’s candidate, again reinforcing the prioritization of out-group animus
over in-group preference (Abramowitz and McCoy 2018, 149; Abramowitz and Webster
2018, 132). Despite both Hillary Clinton and Trump being unfavorable in 2016, copartisans remained loyal to their political party (Abramowitz and Webster 2018, 132).
Despite candidates’ unfavourability in the 2016 election, eighty- nine percent of
Democrats voted for Hillary Clinton while eighty- eight percent of Republicans voted for
Donald Trump (Abramowitz and Webster 2018, 120).
Negative partisanship has been a common strategy employed by the Trump
administration since the beginning of his presidential campaign and throughout his
presidency, thus increasing polarization (Carothers and O’Donohue 2019, 76). Rather
than trying to please the public as a whole, President Trump appeals to his base, the far
right (Carothers and O’Donohue 2019, 76). During Trump’s campaign, he created a
divide between “us,” the true Americans who wanted white males to be in charge, versus
“them,” the immigrants, minorities, liberals, and others that disagree with Trump
(Abramowitz and McCoy 2018, 139). This idea was strengthened throughout the
impeachment proceedings and afterward. Even in his last weeks in office, Trump further
divided the county by claiming the 2020 election was a fraud and instigating violence at
the Capital. Clearly, President Trump consistently attacks opponents and skeptics, makes
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issues partisan, and is hostile towards the media (Carothers and O’Donohue 2019, 76).
Trump views the opposition as the other “team”, who was constantly harassing him and
the Republican Party, which again, illustrates that Trump has relied on the strategy of
negative partisanship and polarization since the beginning of his campaign. He has
consistently rallied his far-right base and other Republicans to feel and act more on his
“side” and push Democrats further away, reinforcing the idea of negative partisanship
among voters.
Because Americans vote this way in elections, it is likely that these same ideas
can be applied to the case of impeachment. This is due to the fact that in both instances
focused on here, impeachment was framed as attacks by the opposing party rather than a
constitutional debate over executive power. Therefore, partisans are likely to stick with
their political party regarding opinions towards impeachment. Additionally, although the
framers discussed impeachment as a constitutional process prior to the advent of modern
political parties, the dynamics of contemporary partisanship has transformed
impeachment into a brazenly political process. Thus, the way that this constitutional
matter is enacted today may lead to questions about the legitimacy of the process, due to
inevitable partisanship that comes with modern politics. For example, attitudes towards
Kenneth Starr’s investigation of Clinton at the time of impeachment revealed that fiftyeight percent of Republicans said that the investigation was impartial, while only ten
percent of Democrats considered it an impartial investigation (Miller 1999, 723).
Comparatively, thirty-seven percent of Republicans said Starr’s investigation was
partisan, while the same figure for Democrats was eighty-eight percent (Miller 1999,
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723). This illustrates the idea of negative partisanship, as Democrats blamed Republican
leaders for impeachment and showed hostility towards Republican leaders. In terms of
opinions on the House impeachment process, thirty-seven percent of Republicans said
that the process was partisan, compared to seventy-four percent of Democrats (Miller
1999, 723). This once again reinforces the prevalence of negative partisanship with
regards to public opinion on impeachment.
In fact, during the Clinton impeachment proceedings, Republicans aimed to
fiercely oppose the Democratic agenda, and at the same time, attack Clinton’s credibility
(Carothers and O’Donohue 2019, 74). Republicans wanted to make this a polarized issue
and did everything they could to blame Democrats (Carothers and O’Donohue 2019, 74).
According to Newt Gingrich, “It was obvious that this was not an issue of the President
having another affair, there was an issue of perjury involved” (Gillon 2008, 224). This
references the partisanship surrounding the Starr investigation led by Kenneth Starr and
the Republican party, which focused on perjury and sex, and thus in turn, made perjury
and sex partisan issues. Gingrich’s quote illustrates the two different perspectives taken
by the two political parties: viewing impeachment as a sex scandal, or something more.
On the other side of the spectrum, at least according to Gingrich, Clinton wanted to
politicize the issue, in order to confuse the general public (Gillon 2008, 225). Gingrich
believed that Clinton wanted the impeachment process to appear as a power struggle
between political parties to the general public, which is how Clinton framed the issue
(Gillon 2008, 225). Thus, based on the Clinton impeachment, it is clear that polarization
plays a factor on both sides.
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The Media and Public Opinion
Every day, the media influences issue salience among the public, otherwise
known as agenda-setting. Agenda- setting refers to the media influencing what topics the
public discusses and finds important (McCombs 2014, 1). The salience of the news
media’s agenda is communicated through where the story appears (McCombs 2014, 1).
For example, if a story is covered on the front page, the media is setting it up to be
viewed as more important than a story covered on the back page (McCombs 2014, 1).
The public is directly influenced by the media’s agenda. Thus, media salience leads to
public salience, in that what issues the media finds to be important will then become
issues that the public finds to be important (McCombs 2014, 2). The first stage in
forming public opinion is creating salience among the public and placing an issue on the
agenda for debate and discussion (McCombs 2014, 2).
Despite the rise of social media, many online sources rely on agenda-setting very
similarly to previous decades dominated by print and television news (McCombs 2014,
18). Additionally, there are very little generational differences in the effect of agendasetting (McCombs 2014, 19). While there is evidence that younger generations are not
exposed to “traditional” media as often as older generations, there is little evidence that a
common public agenda will disappear with differing media outlets (McCombs 2014, 21).
In fact, the differences in types of media used had very little influence on agenda-setting
effects (McCombs 2014, 21). Paying attention to political news in general strongly
influences issue salience, and in fact, matters more than which newspapers or news
television shows one follows (McCombs 2014, 21).
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In addition, issue framing, which is very similar to agenda-setting, shapes what
individuals perceive to be most important, which then alters experiences and behavior
(Haynes, Merolla and Ramakrishnan 2016, 17). Democratic and Republican leaders fight
one another to frame issues first, as they believe that they will influence the public’s
beliefs and behavior (Haynes, Merolla and Ramakrishnan 2016, 17). While this specific
example referenced Republican and Democratic leaders, elites are not the only ones who
frame issues. The mass media frames issues every day, which plays a critical role in what
and how people think about particular issues (Haynes, Merolla and Ramakrishnan 2016,
18). Not only is this news coverage on a daily basis, but it is 24/ 7, with the rise of social
media. Additionally, outside of this, certain news sources have a clear partisan agenda,
such as Fox, which is a right-wing media source. On the contrary, MSNBC is clearly a
liberal news outlet. As a result, the mass public is exposed to near-constant framing of
issues in explicitly partisan terms on a daily basis.
In the context of impeachment, according to Jurkowitz and Mitchel (2020), the
sources that Democrats and Republicans use are directly related to their perceptions of
Trump’s actions towards Ukraine in 2019. Conservatives who only received political
information from right-leaning sources had different responses than liberals who received
information from left-leaning sources (Jurkowitz and Mitchel 2020). Additionally,
partisan views of why Donald Trump withheld information differ depending on the media
source (Jurkowitz and Mitchel 2020). Thus, public opinion is extremely dependent on the
media source by which news is received. Because of the partisan agendas that many news
media corporations possess, news becomes partisan, as the public relies on the news for
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information. In fact, the media tends to present information in a manner that focuses on
the differences between groups, instead of reporting about the general public’s view on
various issues (Anastasio, Rose and Chapman 1999, 155). This idea may be a result of
these biased news outlets, that focus their attention on one end of the spectrum or the
other.
Over time, actual news coverage of the presidency has shifted. Today, there is less
news focused on the President, and the news that is centered around the President is more
negative than in the past (Cohen 2008, 135). In fact, according to Thomas Patterson,
“news outlets have softened their coverage. Their news has also become increasingly
critical in tone” (Cohen 2008, 136). Thus, Patterson illustrates that coverage has both
gotten softer but simultaneously more critical. Compared to the “broadcast era,” the
majority of the public consumes less news, and increasingly distrusts news outlets
(Cohen 2008, 135). While the media constantly evolves and changes, with President
Trump’s 2016 campaign and election, the media dramatically shifted (Hird, Russell and
McCombs 2018, 275). For example, typically, Presidents use the media to convey their
public agenda to the general public. However, President Trump finds the media “biased
and self-serving,” and thus, resorts to Twitter rather than traditional media outlets such as
newspapers or television networks (Hird, Russell and McCombs 2018, 275-276). Rather
than using Twitter to convey important messages, President Trump frequently attacks
opponents in 140 characters or less. This reinforces negative partisanship, as the
President of the country publicly condemns the opposition, which then puts these ideas
into the public’s minds. Not only is the President perpetuating the idea of negative
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partisanship, but the media potentially could be as well. Whether the media is aware of it
or not, by covering Trump’s tweets, media outlets may be strengthening negative
partisanship and increasing the divide between political parties. Finally, the way that the
media discusses and frames their coverage of President Trump, and his Tweets, for
example, potentially influences the public’s views.

Role of the Media, Polarization and Tone
Additionally, the growing media divide helps perpetuate negative partisanship by
allowing partisans to self-select into news sources and stories that best fit their ideologies
and party platforms (Abramowitz and Webster 2018, 128). This idea of selective
exposure argues that viewers opt-in to news-sources that confirm their partisan
preferences or avoid news sources that challenge their beliefs. Moreover, selective
exposure leads to lower tolerance for others’ opposing viewpoints and the adoption of
more extreme views, contributing to the country’s rising aggregate levels of partisan
polarization (Stroud 2010, 557- 558). For example, in the days following the news of the
Clinton- Lewinsky scandal, the story monopolized media coverage (Gillon 2008, 226).
Even the public complained about how excessive the media coverage of the scandal
became (Gillon 2008, 226). In fact, eighty percent of people thought that there was too
much media coverage of the Clinton- Lewinsky scandal (Jacobson 1999, 47).
Additionally, most of the country felt the scandal did not pertain to Clinton’s duties as
President, and thus, the public’s perception of job performance did not change despite the
constant media coverage (McCombs 2014, 66). Americans sympathized with the
President, rather than turned against him (Jacobson 1999, 47). Not only did the public
sympathize with Clinton, but they hated his opponents- the media, Kenneth Starr, and
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Republican Congressional leaders (Jacobson 1999, 44) - which again builds on the idea
of negative partisanship, though such a position may owe to the media coverage at the
time.
Since 1998, technology has only improved, as has the presence of social media.
Because of this technological progress, polarization in the country has evolved.
Ultimately, this technological evolution may have impacted views of impeachment in
2019 as compared to views in 1998. In the modern age, the majority of Americans are
online, which allows the media to play a major role in the daily lives of Americans
(Zakrzewski 2020). Because of the influence of social media, the American public is
becoming increasingly polarized (Zakrzewski 2020). This polarization carried over into
impeachment, with both political parties taking to Facebook and Twitter to spread
polarized messages to the public (Zakrzewski 2020). For example, following his acquittal
by the Senate, Trump tweeted that he would “discuss our Country’s VICTORY on the
Impeachment Hoax!” (Zakrzewski 2020). This is just one example of Trump’s polarized
messages on Twitter and other platforms. Thus, the trend of negative partisanship is a
result of the media’s coverage of politics, or in this instance, impeachment.
It is also important to consider what influences the media’s tone, and how the
media’s tone influences the general public (McCombs 2014, 44). Traditional media
outlets, including newspaper and television operate for profit, and are highly concerned
about income (Glazier and Boydstun 2012, 433). Because of this, “the need to attract and
retain readers drives news outlets to keep coverage fresh and consumption high” (Glazier
and Boydstun 2012, 433). These traditional corporations are concerned with viewership
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and revenue, and will therefore deliver content in the tone that the public most aligns with
(Glazier and Boydstun 2012, 433). Today, selective exposure is extremely prevalent, as
individuals self-select news sources that agree with their political beliefs. For example,
Democrats tend to follow left- leaning news sources, while Republicans follow rightleaning sources. Because of news sources’ political agendas and biases, news then
becomes partisan. Thus, the media is driven to use a certain tone based on what the public
believes, which then reinforces their already existing beliefs.
Additionally, the media’s tone greatly influences the public’s attitudes and beliefs
about politics and causes the public to adjust their behavior or beliefs (McCombs 2014,
103). In fact, the public absorbs the tone that the media uses (Carroll and McCombs
2003, 39). The tone that the media uses actually primes how the public speaks about and
views a certain issue (Carroll and McCombs 2003, 39). For example, “in the USA, a dayby-day observation of the final three months in the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections
found that the tone of television news coverage about key campaign events influenced
voters’ preference for the candidates” (Carroll and McCombs 2003, 41), illustrating the
idea that the media’s tone does influence public opinion. Similarly, McCombs discusses
the 2007 Danish election, and found that, “the more visible a party was in the news and
the more positive the tone of the news reports, the more voters were inclined to vote for
the party” (McCombs 2014, 100). This shows that the tone of media coverage matters to
the public, and even influences how the general population votes for candidates or
political parties. Additionally, with regards to President Clinton’s impeachment, when
coverage of the President was negative, public support for the President decreased (Zaller
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1998, 183). Similarly, in the case of Trump, positive media coverage corresponded to
positive public perceptions of him, reinforcing the impacts that media tone has on the
general public (Sykes 2019).
In fact, even neutral media coverage and tone has lasting effects on the general
public. Neutral media coverage of controversial events frequently causes members of a
group to think that the media is being hostile to their group (Anastasio, Rose and
Chapman 1999, 154). This goes back to Mason’s idea of the ingroup and the outgroup
(2018). Even when the media is neutral in tone towards issues like impeachment or
elections, members of a group automatically assume that the media is against them.
Furthermore, because coverage of both sides of an issue tends to emphasize differences
between sides, the perceivers own group membership is made salient and thus sets in
motion the motivation to perceive the in-group as superior and the out-group as inferior.
Thus, neutral coverage of the in-group is perceived as unfair and hostile in comparison
with the inflated perceptions of the correctness of one’s in-group" (Anastasio, Rose and
Chapman 1999, 154). Again, relating to Mason’s idea of the importance of social and
political groupings, this illustrates that groups prefer that the media validate their group’s
beliefs, rather than cover the issue in a neutral manner. This illustrates that the public
may actually want the media to be biased, but only in favor of their individual group and
not “the other”.

The Public’s Views of Impeachment are… Positive towards the President?
In the case of Clinton, the public’s views of Clinton actually became increasingly
positive following impeachment. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that the public’s
sympathy toward the President extended to his party, as a consequence of impeachment,
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in the 1998 midterm elections. The Democrats, Clinton’s party, actually increased their
number of seats in the House (Abramowitz 2001, 211; Jacobson 1999, 31). In the 1998
election, Republicans lost five seats and Democrats gained five seats (Abramowitz 2001,
211; Jacobson 1999, 31). This is extremely rare: “one of the few iron laws in politics is
the loss of seats by the president’s party in midterm House elections” (Abramowitz,
Cover and Norpoth 1986, 1). Between 1860 and 1982, this law was only broken in 1934
(Abramowitz, Cover and Norpoth 1986, 1). That this reversal of the midterm trend
occurred when the Democratic President was impeached lends credence to the idea that
impeachment actually helped Clinton and his party. Using the 1998 ANES data,
Abramowitz looked at several variables, including: party ID, liberal/ conservative
identification, incumbency status, personal finances, and opinions about the economy.
After impeachment was controlled for, the perceptions of the economy and President
Clinton did not affect public opinion (Abramowitz 2001, 220). This study also found that
the primary reason for the Republican losses in the midterm elections was due to negative
perceptions of Kenneth Starr and the Congressional Republicans handling of
impeachment (Abramowitz 2001, 216).
Following Clinton admitting to his affair with Monica Lewinsky and lying about
it, Presidential job-approval stayed at a constant sixty-two percent (DeSilver 2019). Upon
the House voting to impeach Clinton, his approval increased to seventy-one percent
(DeSilver 2019). At this time, from fall 1998 to mid-December of 1998, approximately
three in ten Americans, or fewer, supported impeaching President Clinton (DeSilver
2019). According to a Pew Research survey from January 1998, seventy-one percent of
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Americans approved of Clinton’s job as President; ten percent higher than a survey right
before the scandal broke (DeSilver 2019). At this point, in January 1998, support for
Clinton was higher than any other time during his Presidency (DeSilver 2019). Thus,
there was an “impeachment bump” in Presidential approval ratings, in which approval of
Clinton spiked, as a result of impeachment (Newport 2020). Throughout the
impeachment process, approval ratings remained very high and the majority of voters
wanted President Clinton to stay in office (Jacobson 2000, 1). Additionally, following the
1999 State of the Union, a poll conducted by the Washington Post found that sixty- seven
percent of the public approved of Clinton’s job performance (Gillon 2008, 228). Again,
this illustrates the public’s positive perceptions of the President, despite the impeachment
proceedings. In fact, most Americans considered Clinton’s impeachment to be all about
sex, while Republicans argued over the rule of law (Gillon 2008, 243). Even when the
Republicans released a tape that was supposed to be indisputable evidence, it actually
boosted Clinton’s approval rating to sixty- eight percent, as shown in a CBS survey
(Gillon 2008, 243).
Another example of approval of President Clinton increasing due to impeachment
is through the economy, which is an important aspect of the country that affects
Presidential approval (Jacobson 1999, 33; Jacobson 2000, 20). According to a Gallup
Poll conducted in the weeks leading up to the 1998 congressional election, sixty-six
percent of the public approved of Clinton (Jacobson 1999, 34). Because of Clinton’s
successes with the economy, the Democratic Party found success on Election Day
(Jacobson 1999, 46). Also, because many Americans believed that the Clinton
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impeachment proceedings were about the President’s sex life, they took Clinton’s side, as
sex was a private matter (Jacobson 1999, 46; Jacobson 2000, 4; Kagay 1999, 458).
Additionally, Clinton’s confession and lying to cover up the scandal could not
“disillusion people who did not have illusions to begin with” (Jacobson 1999, 45;
Jacobson 2000, 4). This can be interpreted in many ways. The public may not have been
illusioned to this issue because they were inclined to like Clinton from the beginning and
saw impeachment as a partisan issue, and nothing could change that. Additionally, people
may have already known Clinton’s ways through his time as governor, and thus were not
illusioned to impeachment. A third potential possibility could be that Gingrich put so
much emphasis on not wanting to work with Democrats, and thus, the public was
predisposed to see the House as unfair and disagreed with them. Finally, Americans
sympathized with the President, calling the investigation a form of bullying; this echoes
President Trump’s description of the process as “Presidential harassment,” which may
have been a reason for the jump in Presidential approval, as mentioned before (Jacobson
1999, 47). To the Democrats and other Clinton supporters, the impeachment of Clinton
by the House was simply a partisan attack on the Democratic party as a whole (Kagay
1999, 455).
Similarly, Trump became more favorable as the impeachment inquiry continued.
Again, this may be attributed to the fact that it is impossible to form educated opinions on
an issue if people are not paying attention to begin with (Newport 2020). In 2019, only
thirty-seven percent of Americans paid attention to the Trump impeachment proceedings
(Newport 2020). Therefore, opinions towards President Trump, the Republican Party,

21

Nancy Pelosi, and the Democratic party should not be significantly altered, as such a
small portion of the population was informed. Possibly due to the lack of attention paid to
the impeachment inquiry, combined with Trump’s tenure over successful economy at the
time, new trade legislation, or other public policies, public opinion actually became more
favorable of Trump through the proceedings (Glimour 2020). As of December 2019
Trump’s approval rating was at forty-five percent; a six percent increase from when
Nancy Pelosi announced the impeachment inquiry (McCarthy 2019). Among
Republicans, in December 2019, eighty-nine percent approved of Trump’s performance,
compared to eight percent of Democrats (McCarthy 2019). Among independents,
approval of President Trump also increased over those few months; from thirty-four
percent to forty-two percent (McCarthy 2019). A Gallup poll conducted between January
16 and January 29, 2020— during the Senate’s vote on the impeachment articles— shows
that forty-nine percent of Americans approve of President Trump, which was the highest
approval rating the Trump Administration had seen since taking office in 2017 (Gilmour
2020). Among Republicans, at this time, approval of Trump reached ninety-four percent,
while only a mere seven percent of Democrats approved of the President (Dzhanova and
Breuninger 2020).
This increase in support for the President, despite impeachment, is likely due to
the media’s role in all of this, through agenda-setting and media framing. This idea of
agenda-setting allows the media to influence what issues the public finds to be important
(McCombs 2014, 1). Agenda-setting is the first step in influencing public opinion, as it
places issues on the public’s agenda for discussion and debate (McCombs 2014, 2). Thus,
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with the case of these two impeachments, the media clearly found them important, which
led the general public to believe they were. Next, the media must frame these issues to
the public, which impacts the public’s views on these topics (Haynes, Merolla and
Ramakrishnan 2016, 18). However, these salient issues are often framed differently,
depending on which source it is, and where it falls on the political spectrum. For
example, Fox News is known to be Republican, while MSNBC is known as more liberal,
and depending which one an individual reads, they may have a different point of view.
Thus, with regard to impeachment, the public’s views of the issue are dependent on
which news source they read, which is often the news source that best aligns with their
views. For example, looking at the Gallup statistic above, in which ninety-four percent of
Republicans approved of Trump, and only seven percent of Democrats approved of
Trump, it is likely that Democrats and Republicans have these different views because of
differences in the way that the media framed these issues, as well as the differences in
which source they are looking at.

Gaps in the Literature
Since presidential impeachment is a relatively rare phenomenon which has only
occurred four times in United States history, the field’s understanding is incomplete.
Therefore, while the topic is incredibly important due to its serious implications, there is
a limited amount of scholarly research on the subject of impeachment. This problem
persists when looking at the case of President Johnson, as it occurred before many public
opinion measures were established. Additionally, in the case of President Trump, because
of how current the information is, it is difficult to find peer-reviewed sources on the
subject, as this process takes time. Finally, no articles really compare the impeachment of
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President Clinton to the impeachment of President Trump, again, due to the recency of
the Trump scandal.
In addition to lack of information, several aspects of American politics and
society in general have changed since 1998. For example, partisan polarization has
increased significantly (Mason 2018, 106). Negative partisanship has also increased, as
Americans’ dislike of the opposing party has outpaced positive feelings toward their own
party (Mason 2018, 21). Third, social media and the Internet have a much greater
presence in the lives of Americans, than they did in 1998. Thus, this may impact public
opinion of President Trump, because there is a constant flow of information, and also
because selective exposure is heightened in these environments. Additionally, the basis of
impeachment is different in both cases. Clinton was impeached because of the sex
scandal. Trump, on the other hand, was impeached for abusing his Presidential power,
which has much more serious implications for the country than the President’s sex life.
Based on the literature, even with these differences between 1998 and 2019, there
is a reason to believe that the media’s role in shaping public opinion of an impeached
president has not changed. Throughout impeachment, the media in general impacts how
people think and feel about the President and their party. For example, in the Clinton
case, leading up to impeachment, his approval rating was roughly sixty percent (Zaller
1998, 182). In the following ten days, as a result of impeachment, media coverage
significantly increased, as did Clinton’s approval rating (Zaller 1998, 182). In fact,
Clinton’s approval was up to seventy percent after only ten days of impeachment
coverage (Zaller 1998, 182). In the case of President Trump, this illustrates the heavy
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influence that media coverage has on public opinion, as measured by Presidential
approval. These same trends are illustrated in a Public Religion Research Institute Study,
which found that fifty-five percent of Republicans who receive news from Fox News say
that anything that Trump did would not decrease their approval of him (Sykes 2019).
Therefore, when coverage of President Trump was positive, via Republican-leaning
sources similar to Fox, public opinion was also positive or unchanged towards the
President. Among twenty-nine percent of Republicans who did not rely on Fox News,
anything that Trump did would not decrease their approval of him (Sykes 2019). Again,
this illustrates that media coverage directly influences public opinion, and also reinforces
partisan norms. Because FOX News is a conservative news source, this illustrates that
levels of partisanship remain constant, if not increase. Additionally, these Republicans
evaluations of President Trump remain positive. I expect to find very similar trends
throughout my project. Media coverage before, during, and after impeachment will
influence levels of negative partisanship as well as evaluations of the President and the
President’s political party. More specifically, I expect that among Independents, when the
media’s tone is neutral or positive, evaluations of the President will remain consistent
with the general public’s opinion as shaped by media coverage. Conversely, among copartisans, when the media’s tone is neutral or positive, negative partisanship will
increase, and evaluations of the President will remain positive. Finally, among opposing
partisans, when the media’s tone is neutral or positive, negative partisanship will
increase, as evaluations of the President remain negative.
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Chapter 3: Theory and Methodology
Theoretical Argument
According to negative polarization, public opinion leans in favor of an
individual’s own political party. Additionally, individuals strongly disagree with, and
even dislike, the opposing party (Mason 2018, 21). Therefore, Republicans will side with
Republicans, and Democrats will side with Democrats on the majority of issues (Mason
2018, 21). This is what occurred in the case of impeachment for both President Clinton
and President Trump. During Clinton’s impeachment hearings, Democrats viewed the
proceedings as partisan attacks on their political party (Kagay 1999, 455). Similarly, in
2019, President Trump and the Republican Party considered the impeachment
proceedings against him to be “Presidential harassment”; more or less, a series of partisan
attacks on President Trump (Newport 2020). In both 1998 and 2019, Democratic and
Republican party leaders used to media to present these messages and frame
impeachment. Democrats portrayed impeachment as abuse towards Clinton, while
Republicans in 2019 turned to Twitter and other news platforms to express that
impeachment was a form of Presidential harassment by the Democrats. Because of the
prevalence of the news media, and in the modern age, Twitter, messages from the media
on the issue of impeachment serve to reinforce party norms (Abramowitz and Webster
2018, 128). Not only does the media reinforce partisan divides, but it strengthens them
(Abramowitz and Webster 2018, 128; Jurkowitz and Mitchel 2020). Due to the media’s
effects and ability to reach most Americans, the media heavily influences public opinion
towards issues. Thus, based on the confluence of negative partisanship and the role of the
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media in shaping public opinion, my first hypothesis is that among co-partisans, when the
media’s tone is neutral or positive, negative partisanship will manifest as positive
attitudes toward the President and his political party. My second hypothesis is that among
opposing partisans, when the media’s tone is neutral or positive, negative partisanship
result in negative attitudes toward the President and his political party. On the other hand,
if coverage is negative, it is likely that co-partisans will continue to favor the President
and the President’s party, while opposing partisans’ views of the President and the
President’s party remain unfavorable.
In terms of independents, “the more an independent is exposed to media coverage,
the more likely it is that she or he will vote for the eventual winner” (Goidel and Shields
1994, 807). Additionally, when looking at elections and voting, media bias typically
biases independents to side with the winner of the election (Goidel and Shields 1994,
807). For example, when the Democrat is expected to win, independents are very likely
to vote for the Democrat, and the same holds true for when the Republican candidate is
expected to win (Goidel and Shields 1994, 808). This may be simply due to the fact that
independents do not have the partisan views that Democrats and Republicans have
(Goidel and Shields 1994, 809). Thus, because independents have no partisan biases, they
cannot possess levels of negative partisanship.
While this model is applied to elections, I expect to see similar trends when it
comes to impeachment. In terms of independents, assuming media coverage is neutral or
positive, I expect that they will lean more on the side of the general public. Thus, my
third hypothesis is that among Independents, when the media’s tone is neutral or positive,
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evaluations of the President will remain consistent with the general public’s opinion. For
example, during the Clinton impeachment, the general consensus and rhetoric revolved
around the sex scandal, and the public saw it this way. In fact, Clinton’s approval during
the impeachment proceedings was higher than any other point during his presidency;
leading up to the 1998 midterm election, Clinton maintained a sixty-six percent approval
rating (Jacobson 1999, 34). For example, following Clinton admitting to his affair with
Monica Lewinsky and lying about it, Presidential job-approval stayed at a constant sixtytwo percent (DeSilver 2019). Upon the House voting to impeach Clinton, his approval
increased to seventy-one percent (DeSilver 2019). At this time, from fall 1998 to midDecember of 1998, approximately three in ten Americans, or fewer, supported
impeaching President Clinton (DeSilver 2019). According to a Pew Research survey
from January 1998, seventy-one percent of Americans approved of Clinton’s job as
President; ten percent higher than a survey right before the scandal broke (DeSilver
2019). At this point, in January 1998, support for Clinton was higher than any other time
during his Presidency (DeSilver 2019). Thus, I expect independents to agree with the
Senate’s decision to acquit Clinton, as this seemed to be the general consensus at the
time. Similarly, a Gallup Poll conducted during the Senate’s vote on the impeachment
articles found that forty-nine percent of Americans approve of President Trump, which at
the time, was the highest it had been at any point during his Presidency (Gilmour 2020).
Therefore, because the general public was rather divided, I expect independents to be
pretty divided when it comes to support for Trump’s removal from office.

28

Operationalization
My unit of analysis is individual voters and their attitudes towards impeachment
of President Clinton or President Trump. My independent variable is the tone/framing of
media coverage during the impeachment process. To measure the intervening variable,
media framing, and the independent variable, I conduct a content analysis of articles
concerning the Clinton and Trump impeachments published by The New York Times and
The Washington Post. My dependent variables include how favorably the public views
impeachment of Clinton and Trump, favorability of the President, and favorability of the
President’s political party. To measure this, I look at the gap in opinions regarding the
impeachment of the President and how this differs by political party, and among
Independents. I primarily use Gallup and Pew Polls to look at the favorability and
approval rating of the President and the President’s party, as well as impeachment itself.
However, due to accessibility constraints, I do use other polls from the Roper iPoll
Database to get quantitative data. Specifically, I am interested in questions related to the
public’s support for impeachment, and Presidential job approval as a measure of
individual attitudes towards the President and the President’s party.

Case Selection and Timeline
The population of cases in which the President was impeached by the House is
four: President Johnson (1868), President Clinton (1998), and President Trump (2019 and
2021). Through the comparative case study approach, I examined two cases of
impeachment by the House: the impeachment of President Bill Clinton and the first
impeachment of President Donald Trump. Out of the four instances in which a United
States President was impeached, President Trump and President Clinton’s cases present
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the most accessible data due to their recency. The second impeachment of President
Trump was not included in this study simply due to the timing of his impeachment.
Andrew Johnson’s impeachment was similarly excluded from this study due to issues
with timing. President Andrew Johnson was impeached in 1868, a period for which there
was a dearth of mass media coverage and scientific public opinion polling. The
impeachments of President Trump (2019) and President Clinton occurred within twentyone years of one another, during periods in which they oversaw relatively successful
national economies. However, there is a large difference in media presence and framing.
At the time of President Trump’s impeachment, media framing was much more
prevalent, likely due to the massive presence of social media, such as Facebook and
Twitter. While media framing was prevalent before the rise of social media, social media
has made biased sources more accessible and circulated among the public. Additionally,
President Clinton had a much higher approval rating than President Trump for the
majority of his presidency. Another difference between the two cases is that both
Presidents were impeached for different reasons.
The Clinton and Trump impeachments also occurred in very different political
atmospheres. Clinton was in his second term during his impeachment proceedings, and
thus was not concerned with re-election. However, in 2019, Trump was in his first term,
and therefore was concerned with getting re-elected in 2020. Additionally, Clinton was
also faced with unified Republican control of Congress, with Republicans in control of
both the House and the Senate. On the contrary, in 2019, Trump faced a Democratic
House and a Republican Senate. Therefore, I am using the method of agreement, as I
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believe these two cases are rather different, but will both have the same outcome in terms
of the media’s effects on public opinion surrounding the Clinton and Trump
impeachments. When looking at the impeachment of Clinton and Trump, they were
widely different in that they were impeached for different reasons, at different points in
their Presidency, different political environments, and so on. However, ultimately, I
believe that in both instances, my hypotheses will hold.
For each case, I standardized the timelines, so that the first time period, preimpeachment, starts two weeks before impeachment was called for in the House, and
ends when a majority of the House formally voted to impeach the President on one or
more articles of impeachment. Therefore, for Clinton, pre-impeachment is from
September 21, 1998- December 19, 1998, and September 10, 2019- December 18, 2019,
for Trump. The second time period, during impeachment, starts the day after the House
impeached the President, and goes through the Senate vote. Thus, during impeachment is
considered December 20, 1998- February 12, 1999 for Clinton, and December 19, 2019February 5, 2020 for Trump. The post impeachment period is from the day after the
Senate vote through two weeks after the Senate vote. February 13, 1999- February 26,
1999 is the post-impeachment period for Clinton, and February 6, 2020- February 19,
2020 is the final period for Trump. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1, below.
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Figure 3.1 Standardized Impeachment Timelines
Clinton

Trump

September 21, 1998 to

September 10, 2019 to

December 19, 1998

December 18, 2019,

December 20, 1998 to

December 19, 2019 to

February 12, 1999

February 5, 2020

February 13, 1999 to

February 6, 2020 to

February 26, 1999

February 19, 2020

Pre-impeachment

During impeachment

Post- impeachment

Content Analysis Method
In terms of content analysis, the dates of the articles I code correspond to the
standardized timelines used to collect poll data. I rely on The New York Times and The
Washington Post as the two newspapers I am coding. I selected these two newspapers
because in both 1998 and 2019, they were two of the most circulated newspapers in the
country, thus wielding significant influence on public opinion (Barringer 1998; Watson
2019). Because I am looking at media framing and public opinion, it is important to use
newspapers that are heavily circulated throughout the country. In addition, these two
newspapers are typically viewed as unpartisan, and strictly factual (Glader 2017).
I code articles from both newspapers according to the author’s tone, and whether
impeachment is framed as a partisan issue or a constitutional issue. This idea of
impeachment as a partisan issue involves the author portraying, and the public
subsequently viewing, impeachment as one party against the other. If impeachment were
a constitutional issue, this means that people have issues with impeachment as a political
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process and the constitutionality of it. Therefore, I consider both of these viewpoints
when coding the newspapers. I look at whether the media coverage is positive or negative
towards the President and the President’s party. Positive coverage refers to positive views
towards the President and the President’s party, and/ or opposing impeachment. Negative
coverage, on the other hand, refers to pro-impeachment and/ or negative perceptions of
the President and the President’s party. This will be done for both the Trump and Clinton
cases.
To find articles, I utilized the ProQuest Newsstream database. In the advanced
search bar, I simply searched for “impeachment,” limiting my results to Newspapers
only, and further specified this to The New York Times and The Washington Post. Next, I
used the filter options to further refine my results, by only selecting editorials as the
document type, selecting only English as the language, and only articles with the full text
accessible. Finally, I limited results to only those articles published between the start and
end dates for each time period. Because of the different time periods and newspapers, I
conducted a total of twelve searches. If any articles that appeared in my final results were
not relevant to impeachment, I did not code them. However, every other article that
appeared in the search results was coded. In total, I coded 114 articles on the Clinton
impeachment era for both news sources combined. For Trump, I coded 57 articles from
both newspapers. The breakdown of time periods and newspaper is illustrated below in
Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2 Articles Coded by Newspaper, President, and Time Period
Number of ArticlesNumber of Articles- Trump
Clinton
New York Times - 31

New York Times - 21

Washington Post- 25

Washington Post - 14

New York Times - 30

New York Times - 8

Washington Post - 23

Washington Post - 11

New York Times - 3

New York Times - 2

Washington Post - 2

Washington Post - 1

Time Period 1

Time Period 2

Time Period 3
As illustrated above in Figure 3.2, for both Presidents there were not many
articles written during time period three, the time immediately following Clinton’s and
Trump’s acquittal in the Senate. This is important to consider in the analysis section, as it
is difficult to draw conclusions based on five or less articles. However, in terms of the
other time periods for both Clinton and Trump, there is a decent number of articles to
aide in my analysis.
Finally, in terms of concerns with this method, content analysis may suffer from
threats to reliability- coding may not always produce the same results for everyone
because the process is inherently subjective, even when the coding parameters themselves
appear to be fairly objective. Thus, I have created a very specific set of guidelines I used
to code the sources in order to minimize the possibility of personal bias in coding.
Additionally, I had two people code five articles each, to ensure that I am consistent and
to avoid personal bias. I compared our level of agreement, and I did have pretty
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consistent results, when comparing their coding to mine. The first coder and I had 90% of
the same responses, and the second coder and I had roughly 85% of the same responses,
for the entire coding sheet. This speaks to the validity of my coding and overall content
analysis, as these results are pretty accurate, considering three people had very similar
outcomes when coding articles.

Coding Guidelines
As mentioned, to avoid personal bias or other threats to reliability, I have created
a specific set of coding guidelines. These will help me consistently and accurately code
the articles from The New York Times and The Washington Post. First, I am tracking
basic information such as which newspaper the article is from, when it was published,
and the word count of the piece. Next, I am looking at if the article is an opinion piece
and/ or a political piece. Opinion pieces are defined as articles that convey the author’s
opinion about impeachment, and political pieces are those that mention politics or any
sort of political process. If the article is an opinion piece, it receives a 1. If the article is
not an opinion piece, it receives a 0. Similarly, if the article is a political piece, it receives
a 1, and if not, a 0 is assigned to this column. Therefore, it is possible for any given
article to receive a 1 in both categories. These variables do not measure the extent to
which the article is opinionated or political, merely it is a measure of if either one, or both
are present at all throughout the piece. Additionally, I am coding for the placement of the
article in the newspaper to help determine the salience. If the article is on the front page
of the newspaper, it is assigned 1. If it appears elsewhere, a 0 is assigned. This is relevant
to issue salience, as where the article is placed in the newspaper- front page or not- is one
of many cues that the news media portrays relative to issue salience (McCombs 2002, 1).
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Next, I am looking at the tone of the articles from the author’s point of view, with
three potential choices: positive, negative, or neutral. Because this is from the author’s
perspective, I am not accounting for outside quotations from individuals. I have defined
positive tone as articles that are anti-impeachment of either President Clinton or President
Trump or convey positive perceptions of the President or the President’s party. Articles
with a negative tone include those that are pro-impeachment of either President Clinton
or President Trump or convey negative perceptions of the President or the President’s
party. Finally, neutral articles are those that don’t take one side or the other, in that they
don’t present either position at all, or they present both positions without conveying the
author’ preference.
Finally, I am coding for depth of coverage using a five point scale. This is the
primary measurement of how the media is framing the issue of impeachment specifically.
On this five point scale, there are several different potential media frames, including
opinion-based, slightly opinionated, neutral (neither or both), constitutional/ political
leaning, and constitutional/ politically based. While earlier I mentioned coding for
opinion and political pieces, this scale is differentiated because first, this is specific to
impeachment, instead of the general focus of an article. Additionally, this focuses on
depth of coverage, so for example, an article can be opinionated, but not solely
opinionated, which is where the five point scale comes into effect. Thus, if the article is
more about the author’s opinion on the validity of the charges, and not about the political
process, it gets coded as a 1. On the other hand, a 5 is assigned to articles with a strong
constitutional or political emphasis. For articles that focus on both the political aspect and
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the author’s personal opinion, the article receives a 3. Thus, this five point scale is rather
similar to the American National Election Survey seven point scale for individual’s
political views. Like the ANES defines individuals as “Democrat- leaning” and
“Republican- leaning”, on my five point scale, a 2 would be “opinion- leaning,” while a 4
would be “political/ constitutional leaning.”
In order to answer my research question, I rely heavily on the coding of The New
York Times and The Washington Post. Therefore, for both the Trump and Clinton cases I
use the coding to help determine several key aspects of my research question. First, and
most basically, these articles illustrate the amount of media coverage during each time
period. Additionally, I use the coding to determine the number of positive versus negative
articles each newspaper produced for each President. Third, I look at the number of
opinion versus political pieces produced by the two newspapers from 1998-1999 and
again in 2019. Finally, I use the coding to determine the average depth of coverage in
each time period, which helps paint a picture of the media coverage of the Presidents
impeachment from both time periods.

Analytic Method
Using the quantitative data from the polls, I first conduct three difference of
means tests for each case to measure public opinion. For this test, I draw on data from
September 21, 1998- December 19, 1998 and September 10, 2019- December 18, 2019 as
my first points; two weeks prior to when the House called for impeachment up to
impeachment by the House. I then look at views at the midpoint of the impeachment
proceedings. For Clinton, I consider the middle period to be December 20, 1998February 12, 1999, and for Trump, December 19, 2019- February 5, 2020; the day after
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impeachment by the House through the Senate vote. Finally, I conduct this test postimpeachment; two weeks following the Senate trial. Thus, for Clinton, February 13,
1999- February 26, 1999. For Trump, post- impeachment is considered February 6, 2020February 19, 2020. Each of these differences of means tests were conducted for each poll
individually, because there is no guarantee that questions or participants are the same for
each poll. Additionally, I conduct these tests to compare each political party against
another; Democrats vs. Republicans, Democrats vs. Independents, and Republicans vs.
Independents. This illustrates the levels of polarization at the time.
I expect the results from these difference of means tests to be similar to my three
hypotheses. Therefore, I predict that in the three Clinton time periods, Democrats will be
more in favor of Clinton than Republicans. Additionally, I expect Democrats’ and
Republicans’ levels of negative partisanship to increase. Independents will also lean more
towards supporting Clinton; however, their support will likely not be as strong as
Democrats’, while negative partisanship remains relatively constant. In terms of the three
Trump time periods, I expect Republicans to be significantly more in favor of Trump and
the Republican party than Democrats, however, negative partisanship will increase
among both parties. Because of the prevalence of negative articles directed towards
Trump and Republicans in 2019 and 2020, I expect that Independents will lean more
towards the Democrats perspective, as they tend to stick with the perceived majority
(Goidel and Shields 1994, 807). However, because independents do not identify as one
party or the other, they cannot express negative partisanship. Thus, in relation to my
hypotheses, I expect to see similar trends. In both the Clinton and Trump cases, I expect
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that among the President’s co-partisans, negative partisanship will increase, as
evaluations of the President and their party remain positive. On the other hand, I expect
that for both cases, opposing partisans will increase their negative partisanship and
maintain negative views of the President and the President’s party. Finally, in terms of
independents, primarily in the case of Clinton, I expect their evaluations of the President
to follow the general public’s views, which are themselves shaped by the overall tenor of
media coverage toward Clinton and Trump.
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Chapter 4: Results and Analysis
Introduction
Through this study, I am examining the implications of media coverage on public
opinion before, during, and after impeachment. When examining this relationship in
regard to presidential impeachment, I expect to find high levels of polarization and
negative partisanship among the two major political parties. More specifically, I expect
that among the President’s co-partisans, when the media’s tone is neutral or positive,
negative partisanship will manifest as positive attitudes toward the President and his
political party. My second hypothesis is that among opposing partisans, when the media’s
tone is neutral or positive, negative partisanship result in negative attitudes toward the
President and his political party. Finally, I expect that among Independents, when the
media’s tone is neutral or positive, evaluations of the President will remain consistent
with the general public’s opinion.
In order to assess these hypotheses, I standardized the impeachment timelines of
President Clinton and President Trump’s first impeachment, and divided them each into
three different time periods. I then conducted a content analysis of two national, rather
unbiased newspapers, The New York Times and The Washington Post. When coding these
editorials, I paid particular attention to the tone of the article, as well as if it was more
opinion-based, or more political-based. I then conducted difference
e of means tests on different public opinion polls that corresponded to each time period.
Finally, I compared the coding data to the difference of means tests.
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This chapter will follow a similar format to my actual methodology. First, I will
discuss the coding of the articles, and go through an example of a positive, neutral, and
negative article. Then, I will discuss each time period for each President, beginning with
the coding, and then looking at the quantitative data from the polls. Finally, I will
compare and contrast the Clinton and Trump cases at the end of the chapter.

Content Analysis
The first sample coding sheet is for a positive article from The Washington Post
during the first Clinton Era1. As shown on the sample coding sheet, this article was both
opinionated as well as political. For example, the author states, “While we believe that the
allegations against Mr. Clinton -- even if proven -- should not trigger his removal…,”
which makes this an opinionated piece (The Senate Trial, 1999, emphasis added). This is
because this was the author’s stated opinion on the issue, arguing that Clinton should not
be impeached, according to The Washington Post. Additionally, the author discussed how
the Senate trial might play out as well as the potential of calling witnesses, making this a
political piece. This article is positive towards the President and the Democratic party
because it states, “The House, in our opinion, erred in its decision to impeach Mr.
Clinton” (The Senate Trial, 1999). Here, the author blatantly states that Clinton should
not have been impeached. Finally, in terms of depth of coverage, this article received a
three because it was a pretty even mixture between opinion as well as political fact or
discussion. For the purposes of my coding, depth of coverage is a scale of how
opinionated and political the article is, with a 1 being extremely opinionated, and a 5

1

At the end of the Appendix is where all of the coding data and sample coding sheets as well as sample
articles are located.
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being primarily political. In relation to public opinion, I expect that when Democrats (copartisans) encounter this article, or an article similar to this, they will continue to side
with their Party, and argue that Clinton should not be impeached or acquitted. When
Republicans encounter this article or a similar article, I expect that they will continue to
be against Clinton, and stay true to relation to public opinion, I expect that when
Democrats (co-partisans) encounter this article, or an article similar to this, they will
continue to side with their Party, and argue that Clinton should not be impeached or
acquitted. When Republicans encounter this article or a similar article, I expect that they
will continue to be against Clinton, and stay true to the Republican Party. Finally, in
terms of Independents, I expect that when they encounter this article or a similar one,
they will lean towards Democrats, because of this positive coverage towards Clinton and
Democrats.
In the Appendix, the third sample coding sheet and corresponding article is a
neutral article from The Washington Post, during the first Clinton time period. This
article was coded as both an opinion piece and a political piece. I coded it as opinionated
because for example, the article states, “Our instinct is to favor disclosure, and the
committee's earlier decision to release the full report of independent counsel Kenneth
Starr was absolutely correct” (So Far, Not So Good 1998). It is also political, however, as
it discusses the “checks against abuse,” as well as disagreement between the political
parties. Finally, it received a three in terms of depth of coverage, because it was a fairly
equal amount of the author’s opinion as well as political facts about the impeachment or
process. Again, depth of coverage acts as a scale, measuring how opinionated and
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political the article is. In relation to public opinion, I expect that when Democrats (copartisans) encounter this article, or an article similar to this, they will continue to side
with their Party, and argue that Clinton should not be impeached or acquitted, as the
article is a neutral article. When Republicans encounter this article or a similar article, I
expect that they will continue to be against Clinton, and stay true to the Republican Party,
despite the article being neutral. Finally, in terms of Independents, I expect that when
they encounter this article or a similar one, they will lean towards Democrats, because of
this neutral coverage towards Clinton and Democrats.
The third article is a negative article from The Washington Post during the second
Trump time period. I coded this article as opinionated and political, and in terms of tone,
it was negative. This article was coded as opinionated because, for example, it states,
“But if Republicans muzzle potential witnesses and suppress relevant documents, senators
who respect the Constitution will be left with only one honorable choice” (The
Consequences of Coverup 2020, emphasis added). Therefore, this article is opinionated
as it says that the Republicans are “muzzling,” or silencing witnesses, likely for the
benefit of Trump and their party. Additionally, the author uses the phrases “honorable
choice” and “respect the Constitution,” implying that if one respects the Constitution, the
only respectable thing to do is to impeach Trump. I coded this as political because it
discusses public opinion polls about impeachment, the process itself, and the decision to
call witnesses. Finally, in terms of depth of coverage, I coded this article a 2. This is
because, throughout, the author uses words like “should” and “would be,” for example,
which he or she uses to convey their opinion. Additionally, while the piece is definitely
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political, it is much more about the author’s opinion rather than the political process
itself. In relation to public opinion, I expect that when Republicans (co-partisans)
encounter this article, or an article similar to this, they will continue to side with their
Party, and argue that Trump should not be impeached or acquitted, despite the article
being negative. When Democrats encounter this article or a similar article, I expect that
they will continue to be against Trump, and stay true to the Democratic Party. Finally, in
terms of Independents, I expect that when they encounter this article or a similar one,
they will lean towards Democrats, because of this negative coverage of Trump and
Republicans.

Clinton
In terms of media perceptions of President Clinton before, during and after
impeachment, the media portrayed him in a rather positive light. Throughout
impeachment, the majority of coverage regarding Clinton, the Democratic party, and
whether or not to impeach, was either neutral or positive, as Figure 4.1 illustrates.
Figure 4.1: Number and Percentage of Articles by Time Period and Tone- Clinton
Case
Positive

Neutral

Negative

20

22

17

Period 1

59
(33.89%)

(37.29%)

(21.81%)

26

20

6

Period 2
Period 3

Total #

52
(50%)

(38.46%)

(11.54%)

2

2

1

44

5

Total #

(40%)

(40%)

(20%)

48

44

24

116

As Figure 4.2 illustrates below, I recoded the data in the survey to better interpret
the data. In this instance, a “0” represents anti- impeachment, while a “1” represents proimpeachment of President Clinton. As illustrated, across both time periods, only 165
Republicans were against Clinton’s impeachment, while 406 Republicans were in favor
of his impeachment. Looking at Figure 4.1 above, the majority of articles were either
neutral or positive towards Clinton and the Democratic party. This speaks to the idea of
polarization and negative partisanship, as Republicans still turned against Clinton
regardless of how the media portrayed him. Looking at the Democrat column of Figure
4.2, we see the opposite trends, with 669 Democrats against impeachment, across both
time periods. Only 64 Democrats were in favor of impeaching President Clinton. Given
the media coverage illustrated in Figure 4.1, this makes sense, as most coverage was
neutral or positive towards Clinton and the Democratic party. Finally, tuning to
Independents in the figure below, Independents were pretty split throughout both time
periods. Across both time periods, 232 Independents sided with Republicans, while 504
sided with Democrats. It is interesting to compare this figure with Figure 4.1, and see
what role media coverage plays in this, particularly when it comes to Independents. In the
first time period, as Figure 4.1 shows, over 70% of media coverage is neutral or positive
towards Clinton and the Democrats. Interestingly enough, nearly 70% of Independents
were against the impeachment of Clinton. In period two, as shown above, close to 90% of
media coverage was neutral or positive, while 63% of Independents were against
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impeachment at this time. While slightly fewer Independents’ opinions correlated with
media coverage in the second time period, it still illustrates that in both time periods, the
media may influence the public’s opinions, especially when it comes to Independents.
Figure 4.2: Overall Breakdown of Political Party and Feelings towards
Impeachment (For or Against Impeachment)- Clinton
Republicans

Democrats

Independents

Against: 99 (30.94%)

Against: 375 (92.36%)

Against: 267 (67.77%)

For: 207 (64.69%)

For: 28 (6.90%)

For: 105 (26.65%)

Against: 66 (23.74%)

Against: 294 (88.55%)

Against: 237 (63.03%)

For: 199 (71.58%)

For: 36 (10.84%)

For: 127 (33.78%)

Period 1

Period 2

I conducted difference of means tests to determine if variations in support or
opposition to Clinton’s impeachment were significantly affected by partisan identity. The
results are reported below in Figure 4.3. Unsurprisingly, the largest difference in means is
between Republicans and Democrats. The difference of means measures how far apart
opinion are between the average Republican and the average Democrat. Therefore, this
shows that Republicans and Democrats have very differing opinions on the subject of
impeachment. As shown below in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4, the difference of means are
relatively similar across time periods, and show a marked difference between the two
parties.
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Figure 4.3: Difference of Means- Clinton Pre-Impeachment Period

Republicans

Republicans

Democrats

Independents

_______

0.578!
(0.028)

0.380!
(0.035)

Democrats

0.578!
(0.028)

_______

0.198!
(0.025)

Independents

0.380!
(0.035)

0.198!
(0.025)

_______

*The first number in each box is the difference of means, while the value in parentheses
is the difference in the standard error. All of the values were rounded to the third decimal
place.
** The (+) indicates values that are statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval
level
***For full difference of means tests see Appendix.
When comparing these quantitative results in Figure 4.3 to the qualitative data
from the coding in Figure 4.1, it is evident that impeachment is a rather partisan issue.
First, looking at the pre-impeachment time period in the Clinton case, from September
21, 1998- December 19, 1998, over 70% of media coverage at this time was neutral or
positive towards the President and his party, and anti-impeachment. Because most of the
media coverage was neutral or positive during this time, the majority of media coverage
was against impeaching Clinton and/ or was in favor of him or the Democratic party. For
example, one positive article states, “But in this case, impeachment is an overly broad
response… In the face of failure, this article is irresponsible… The abuse of power
article, likewise, is a mistake” (Impeachment and Censure 1998). This article is a good
example of coverage at this time, as the author is clearly against the impeachment of
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President Clinton. As the difference of means test shows, between Republicans and
Democrats, there is a large difference in the means, which illustrates that many more
Republicans wanted Clinton impeached than Democrats. In fact, the difference in means
between the two parties was 0.578, as shown above in Figure 4.3. Not only is the
difference in means between the two parties statistically significant, but it is also
substantively significant. On a scale from zero to one, this differences takes up over half
the scale, which shows a significant difference in opinions between the two parties. In
fact, only 28 out of 406 Democrats felt Clinton should be impeached.
It is, however, interesting that at the end of this time period, some Democrats and
Republicans crossed party lines in the House votes on the articles of impeachment. For
example, on the first article of impeachment, five Democrats voted in favor of it, while
five Republicans voted against it (Hyde 1999). With regard to the second article of
impeachment, twenty-eight Republicans voted against it, and five Democrats voted in
favor of it (Hyde 1999). For the third and fourth articles, five Democrats and twelve
Republicans crossed party lines in voting for the third article, while one Democrat and
eighty-one Republicans did so in voting for the last article (Hyde 1999). This is rather
interesting, as some co-partisans in the House turned against Clinton, regardless of media
coverage. This could illustrate that Members of Congress do not care what the media
thinks, or maybe it is simply because they felt Clinton did something wrong, and voted
that way because polarization was not as strong at the time.
My first hypothesis- among co-partisans, when the media’s tone is neutral or
positive, negative partisanship will manifest as positive attitudes toward the President and
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his political party- receives strong support in this first time period for Clinton. Among
Democrats, Clinton’s political party, the majority felt positively towards Clinton and his
party when the media coverage was over 70% neutral or positive. My second hypothesis
was that among opposing partisans, when the media’s tone is neutral or positive, negative
partisanship result in negative attitudes toward the President and his political party.
Looking at the Republican Party, as Figure 4.3 shows, when media coverage was over
70% neutral or positive in the pre-impeachment period, a large number of Republicans
supported impeachment. This supports my second hypothesis in this case. Finally, my
third hypothesis is that among Independents, when the media’s tone is neutral or positive,
evaluations of the President will remain consistent with the general public’s opinion.
Again, in the pre-impeachment period, media coverage was primarily neutral or positive
towards Clinton and the Democrats. In terms of Independents’ views towards Clinton and
the Democrats, there was a rather small difference in the means between Independents
and Democrats (0.198), and about twice that distance between Independents and
Republicans (0.380). However, the difference of means between Democrats and
Independents, as shown in Figure 4.3, is less than 0.2, which means on a scale of zero and
one, they have very similar opinions on impeachment- both the mean Democrat and mean
Independent are supportive of Clinton and disapprove of his impeachment. Consistent
with my third hypothesis Independents were closer to the views of Democrats than
Republicans, likely driven in no small part by the generally neutral or positive media
coverage of Clinton and a consequent distaste for impeachment among the general
public, as Figure 4.2 illustrates above.
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Figure 4.4: Difference of Means- Clinton “During” Impeachment Period

Republicans

Republicans

Democrats

Independents

_______

0.607!
(0.031)

0.378!
(0.037)

Democrats

0.607!
(0.031)

_______

0.229!
(0.031)

Independents

0.378!
(0.037)

0.229!
(0.031)

_______

*The first number in each box is the difference of means, while the value in parentheses
is the difference in the standard error. All of the values were rounded to the third decimal
place.
** The (+) indicates values that are statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval
level
***For full difference of means tests see Appendix.
Looking now at Clinton’s “during” impeachment time period, from December 20,
1998- February 12, 1999- from the moment the House voted to impeach until the end of
the Senate trial- there are very similar trends to the pre-impeachment period, in terms of
public opinion shown in Figure 4.3. During the second time period, as shown in Figure
4.1, over 80% of media coverage was neutral or positive, with roughly 11.5% being
negative towards Clinton and the Democrats, or in favor of impeachment. Here, again,
the majority of coverage is in favor of Clinton and his political party, and/or against
impeachment. For example, a positive article clearly states,
But we also contend that Mr. Clinton should finish his term because his failures
are not of a scale to qualify under the Constitution as high crimes or
misdemeanors. Also, Mr. Clinton’s offenses arise from personal behavior rather
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than matters of state and do not warrant an alteration in the orderly transfer of
power that is an anchor of American democracy (The Constitutional Test 1999).
Thus, the author of this article clearly states that Clinton should not be impeached, as it
does not qualify according to the Constitution. This article is representative of the
average article during this time period. During the “during” impeachment time period,
most coverage of Clinton was positive, and focused on the constitutionality of
impeachment in the case of Clinton and the Lewinsky scandal.
Turning now to the difference of means tests, it is interesting to note that the
difference of means between both Republicans and Democrats and Independents and
Democrats actually increased, while the difference of means between Republicans and
Independents decreased during this period. As shown in Figure 4.4, the mean of
Republicans is much higher than the mean of Democrats, therefore, far more Republicans
want Clinton removed from office than Democrats. In fact, the difference of means
between the two parties was 0.607, as shown in Figure 4.4. Looking at the Senate votes,
forty-five Republicans and zero Democrats voted to impeach Clinton, while ten
Republicans and forty-five Democrats voted not to impeach Clinton. This is rather
interesting, as ten Republicans crossed party lines in this vote, which goes against the
idea of negative partisanship. However, in terms of the public opinion polls, negative
partisanship and polarization were rather prevalent. Going back to my hypotheses, first in
terms of co-partisans, or Democrats in this case, most of the coverage during this time
period was neutral or positive, and still, a very small number of Democrats wanted
Clinton removed from office. On the contrary, looking at the opposing partisans, the
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Republicans, with media coverage being neutral or positive in this time period, still held
true to their political party, and wanted Clinton removed from office. This is evident
through the difference of means tests comparing Democrats and Republicans, where the
difference was both statistically significant and substantively significant. The difference
between the two was 0.607, which is a large difference on a scale from zero to one,
taking up nearly two thirds of the scale. Thus, proving that in the “during” impeachment
period, my first and second hypotheses were correct once again.
Looking now at Independents, both the difference of means between Democrats
and Independents and Republicans and Independents were statistically significant, but
were not substantively significant. As Figure 4.4 illustrates, the difference between
Democrats and Independents was 0.229, which is pretty close on the scale. Republicans
and Independents were also pretty close, but their difference was slightly larger, of 0.378.
Thus, Independents leaned more on the side of Democrats, and therefore against
impeachment. Turning to my final hypothesis, as Figure 4.2 shows, the majority of
people were against impeachment during this time period. In fact, 62.25% of respondents
during this time period were against impeachment. Because Independents slightly
favored Democrats and anti-impeachment, my third hypothesis is supported for this time
period as well.
For the third Clinton time period- post impeachment, running from February 13,
1999 to February 26, 1999- I could not access any well-conducted poll data, but I would
expect the same trends to occur throughout this period. Even with respect to the coding,
there were only five articles collectively from The New York Times and The Washington
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Post. Therefore, maybe after the Senate votes to acquit the President, the media no longer
cares about impeachment and is ready to re-set their agenda so to speak, and influence the
public on another issue. Because the media no longer cares, the public may no longer
care or have opinions about impeachment, and that is why poll data was not accessible. In
terms of the five articles that I did have, two were positive, two were neutral, and one was
negative, as Figure 4.1 shows. While coverage was pretty evenly split, I would attribute
this to the fact that the number of articles was very limited.

Trump
Contrary to the neutral or positive portrayal of Clinton, Trump and the Republican
party were frequently portrayed in a negative light by the media during Trump’s
impeachment. Throughout the three different time periods, there were no articles with a
positive tone towards Trump or the Republican Party, or arguing against impeaching the
President. While the vast majority of articles were negative, relatively small percentages
were coded as neutral in tone, as illustrated in Figure 4.5. However, it is important to note
that just because the media coverage here was not positive, does not mean these news
sources are biased. In fact, there are countless potential explanations for this, such as
maybe the newspapers thought most of their readers identified as Democrats or liberals,
and felt there was no point in covering Trump and the Republican party in a positive way.
Additionally, maybe in 2019, the media felt there was much more and stronger evidence
to justify impeaching and convicting Trump than Clinton, and shaped its coverage
accordingly.
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Figure 4.5: Percentage of Articles by Time Period and Tone- Trump Case
Positive
Period 1

Period 2

Period 3
Total #

Neutral

Negative

Total #

6

29

35

(17.14%)

(82.86%)

1

18

(5.25%)

(94.74%)

1

2

(33.33%)

(66.67%)

8

49

_____
19

_____
3

_____
0
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As Figure 4.6 illustrates below, I recoded the data in the survey to better interpret
the data. In this instance, a “0” represents anti- impeachment, while a “1” represents proimpeachment of President Trump. As illustrated, across all time periods, 94.28% of
Republicans were against Trump’s impeachment, while only 5.72% of Republicans were
in favor of his impeachment. Looking at Figure 4.5 above, this is rather interesting, as
there were no positive articles towards Trump at all. This speaks to the idea of
polarization and negative partisanship, as Republicans still sided with Trump regardless
of how the media portrayed him. Looking at the Democrat column of Figure 4.6, we see
the opposite trends, with 90.80% of Democrats in favor of impeachment, across all time
periods. Only 9.20% of Democrats were against impeaching President Trump. Given the
media coverage illustrated in Figure 4.5, this makes sense, as most coverage was neutral
or negative towards Trump and the Republican party.
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Finally, tuning to Independents in the figure below, Independents were pretty split
throughout all three time periods. Across all three time periods, 53.79% of Independents
sided with Democrats, while 46.21% sided with Republicans. To better understand the
role of media coverage in the Trump impeachment with respect to Independents, it is
important to compare Figures 4.5 and 4.6. In the first time period, over 80% of articles
were negative towards Trump and Republicans, and 62% of Independents were in favor
of impeachment. In the second time period, media coverage was over 90% negative,
while only 54% of Independents were in favor of impeachment. This is very interesting,
as more coverage here is negative, but public opinion among Independents actually
becomes more in favor of Trump. In period three, 66% of articles were negative, and
opinion among Independents was almost an equal split. While there were a very limited
number of articles during this time period, it is still interesting that public opinion among
Independents is divided. While the majority of Independents in each time period were in
favor of impeachment, the number actually decreases as time goes on. Therefore, maybe
media coverage does not play as big of a role as expected. Another potential explanation
for this trend may be because people are actually paying attention to the news and
formulating their own attitudes on Trump’s impeachment, rather than following cues
from the media. Finally, this could be because there were actually fewer Independents in
2019-2020 than in the Clinton era. Maybe, some of the respondents that said they were
Independent actually leaned Democrat or Republican, and therefore have partisan views
on the issue of impeachment, as well as potentially other salient issues. Then, their
political leaning or affiliation may not have been accounted for in this analysis.
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Figure 4.6: Overall Breakdown of Political Party and Feelings towards
Impeachment (For or Against Impeachment)- Trump
Republicans

Democrats

Independents

Against: 797 (89.35%)

Against: 48 (3.64%)

Against: 348 (37.62%)

For: 95 (10.65%)

For: 1272 (96.36%)

For: 577 (62.38%)

Against: 2933 (94.55%)

Against: 419 (9.58%)

Against: 1664 (45.75%)

For: 169 (5.45%)

For: 3953 (90.42%)

For: 1973 (54.25%)

Against: 2420 (95.69%)

Against: 392 (10.76%)

Against: 1475 (49.43%)

For: 109 (4.31%)

For: 3251 (89.24%)

For: 1509 (50.57%)

Period 1

Period 2

Period 3

In terms of the public opinion polls, the largest difference in means is between
Republicans and Democrats, as expected. As shown below in Figure 4.7, Figure 4.8, and
Figure 4.9, the difference of means are relatively consistent across time periods, though
they vary greatly depending on the parties.
Figure 4.7: Difference of Means- Trump Case, Pre-Impeachment Period

Republicans

Republicans

Democrats

Independents

_______

0.857!
(0.011)

0.517!
(0.019)

Democrats

0.857!
(0.011)

_______

0.340!
(0.015)

Independents

0.517!
(0.019)

0.340!
(0.015)

_______
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*The first number in each box is the difference of means, while the value in parentheses
is the difference in the standard error. All of the values were rounded to the third decimal
place.
** The (+) indicates values that are statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval
level
***For full difference of means tests see Appendix.
Similar to what I mentioned in the Clinton case, impeachment is clearly a partisan
issue, and public opinion among parties tends to follow partisan trends, as shown in
Figure 4.7. First, looking at the pre-impeachment period for the Trump case, from
September 10, 2019- December 18, 2019, over 80% of media coverage towards Trump
and the Republican party was negative, and favored impeachment. Thus, the majority of
coverage was negative towards Trump and his party, and/ or in favor of impeachment.
For example, one negative article states
There is already abundant evidence that Mr. Trump has abused his power, holding
out hundreds of millions of dollars to secure a bribe from a foreign government he
wanted to investigate his political rival. In the process, he undermined American
national security, and he is continuing to obstruct efforts by a coequal branch of
government to get to the bottom of what happened. These are classic examples of
impeachable offenses; some are federal crimes (Implicating the President and His
Men 2019).
The author of this article was clearly in favor of impeaching President Trump, making
this a negative article, and thus, an example of the majority of coverage during this time.
During this time period, the House voted on two articles of impeachment. In the first
article, the abuse of power article, all 195 Republicans voted against impeachment, while
229 Democrats voted in favor of impeachment, and two Democrats voted against it
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(Nadler 2020). The article two vote, regarding obstruction of Congress, was the same, but
with one more Democrat voting against the article of impeachment (Nadler 2020). This
illustrates the increased polarization and negative partisanship in the country, even among
Members of Congress. As Figure 4.7 illustrates, there was major gap in the mean
between Democrats and Republicans, with significantly more Democrats that thought
Trump’s actions were grounds for impeachment. Not only is this difference statistically
significant, it is also substantively significant, as 0.857, on a scale of zero to one, takes up
almost the entire scale, indicating a major difference between the means. In fact, only 48
out of 1,272 Democrats did not think Trump’s actions were grounds for impeachment,
while only 95 out of 797 Republicans felt his actions did warrant impeachment.2
Turning now towards my first hypothesis, which is that among co-partisans, when
the media’s tone is neutral or positive, negative partisanship will manifest as positive
attitudes toward the President and his political party. However, while media coverage
was primarily negative towards Trump and Republicans during this time period, as
Figure 4.5 illustrates, there is still a lot to be said about Democrats and Republicans in
relation to my hypotheses. In terms of co-partisans, or Republicans in this case,
regardless of media coverage, they stayed true to their political party. This illustrates the
high levels of polarization in the country, considering the fact that the two sources I
analyzed printed no positive articles of Trump. However, other sources could have

2

In this poll, respondents were given four options when asked if Trump’s actions were grounds for
impeachment. I recoded the options “definitely” and “probably” as believing Trump’s actions were
sufficient grounds for impeachment, and the options “probably not” and “definitely not” as believing
Trump’s actions did not constitute grounds for impeachment.
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printed only positive articles about Trump and Republicans, and maybe these were the
only sources that Republicans read. This speaks to the effects of selective exposure,
which is the idea that individuals self-select news sources and media that most agree with
their views (Gillon 2008, 226; Stroud 2010, 557- 558). In terms of Democrats, or
opposing partisans, they expectedly went against the Republicans and Trump, in the same
direction as media coverage. However, with both Republicans and Democrats here, this
may show that media coverage simply does not matter, and that partisans already have
their minds made up. Whatever their political party agrees with, individual members of
that party may just agree, without looking into the issue or caring about media coverage
at all. Along with selective exposure, this pattern may explain why the divide between the
parties is so evident throughout the Trump case, but it was not for Clinton.
Now looking at Independents, there is a pretty significant gap between
Republicans and Independents, and a relatively small gap between Independents and
Democrats, as Figure 4.7 shows. Between Republicans and Independents, the difference
of means is 0.517, which is just over half of the scale. This is a large substantive
difference between the two groups, illustrating that in general Independents are pretty far
from Republicans in their views. Between Democrats and Independents, the difference of
means is 0.340, which while statistically significant, is not quite as substantively
significant. Democrats and Independents are pretty close on their views, though not as
many Independents agree that Trump should be impeached. However, looking at Figures
4.5 and 4.6, we see the majority of media coverage was negative and the majority of the
public was in favor of impeachment. While the effect is weaker than during Clinton’s

59

impeachment, Independents still seem to respond to the tenor of media coverage as
manifest in the general public’s attitudes, and were generally in favor of impeachment.
Figure 4.8: Difference of Means- Trump Case, “During” Impeachment Period

Republicans

Republicans

Democrats

Independents

_______

0.850!
(0.006)

0.488!
(0.010)

Democrats

0.850!
(0.006)

_______

0.362!
(0.009)

Independents

0.488!
(0.010)

0.362!
(0.009)

_______

*The first number in each box is the difference of means, while the value in parentheses
is the difference in the standard error. All of the values were rounded to the third decimal
place.
** The (+) indicates values that are statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval
level
***For full difference of means tests see Appendix.
Comparing this to the second time period, the “during” impeachment period from
December 19, 2019- February 5, 2020, as Figure 4.3 shows, over 90% of media coverage
was negative towards Trump and Republicans, and in favor of impeachment. The
majority of articles were in favor of impeachment and/ or negative towards the President
and his party. For example, one negative article from this time period states, “Mr.
Trump’s defense is designed to destroy those guardrails. If Republican senators go along
with it, they will not only be excusing behavior that many of them believe to be improper.
They will be enabling further assaults by Mr. Trump on the foundations of American
democracy” (An Extraordinary Expansion of Power 2020). This author concludes by
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stating that Trump is “assaulting” our democracy, demonstrating the intensity of the
media’s negative coverage of Trump in the “during impeachment” period. During this
time period, the Senate voted on the articles of impeachment, and acquitted Trump. All
fifty-three Republicans voted to acquit Trump, while two Independents and all forty-five
Democrats found Trump guilty (Nadler 2020). Similar to the House vote, this again
illustrates partisan norms, as no Senators crossed party lines. Interestingly enough, both
Independent Senators voted on the side of the Democrats, which also corresponds to the
news coverage of Trump and the Republican Party. Like the pre-impeachment time
period, there is a massive difference in means between Republicans and Democrats, with
Democrats very much in favor of removing Trump from office. As Figure 4.8 illustrates,
the difference of means between Republicans and Democrats is statistically significant. It
is, in fact, also substantively significant, as on this scale of zero to one, the difference is
0.850, which is nearly the entire scale, which shows how vastly different the two parties
feel about impeaching Trump. Turning now towards my first hypothesis, while media
coverage was primarily negative towards Trump and Republicans during this time period,
as Figure 4.5 illustrates, there is still a lot to be said about Democrats and Republicans in
relation to my hypotheses. In terms of co-partisans, or Republicans in this case,
regardless of media coverage, they stayed true to their political party. Democrats also
stayed true to their political party, with the majority in favor of impeaching President
Trump. Again, this speaks to the high levels of polarization in the United States, and
potentially, even selective exposure like I discussed in my analysis of Trump’s first time
period.
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In terms of Independents, the differences in means between Independents and
Republicans and Independents and Democrats is rather similar to the differences in
period one. Looking at Figure 4.8 above, the difference of means between Independents
and Republicans is 0.488, which is pretty significant, taking up almost half of the scale.
This illustrates that Independents and Republicans still feel pretty differently about the
issue. In terms of Democrats and Independents, the difference of means is 0.362, which is
statistically significant, but not quite as substantively significant. Generally speaking,
Independents hold similar views to Democrats- the mean Independent and mean
Democrat both support impeaching Donald Trump- but it is interesting that there is a very
slight increase in the difference of means between Independents and Democrats from the
pre-impeachment period to the “during” impeachment period. Slightly fewer
Independents wanted Trump removed from office once he had actually been impeached.
At the same time, there is a small decrease in the difference of means between
Independents and Republicans, which again shows that fewer Independents wanted
Trump to be removed. Looking at Figure 4.5, media coverage was mostly negative
towards Trump and Republicans. As Figure 4.6 illustrates, the majority of respondents
were in favor of impeachment. Overall, Independents once again sided with the majority
and the media. However, compared to the first time period, as Figure 4.6 shows, slightly
less Independents are in favor of impeachment in this time period. As we move through
the Trump impeachment timeline, the effect of media coverage appears to diminish for
Independents.
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Figure 4.9: Difference of Means- Trump Case, Post-Impeachment Period

Republicans

Republicans

Democrats

Independents

_______

0.849!
(0.007)

0.463!
(0.011)

Democrats

0.849!
(0.007)

_______

0.387!
(0.010)

Independents

0.463!
(0.011)

0.387!
(0.010)

_______

*The first number in each box is the difference of means, while the value in parentheses
is the difference in the standard error. All of the values were rounded to the third decimal
place.
** The (+) indicates values that are statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval
level
***For full difference of means tests see Appendix.
Finally, in the post impeachment period, from February 6, 2020- February 19,
2020, media coverage became much more neutral in comparison to the previous two time
periods, with only 66% of coverage being negative, as Figure 4.5 shows. However, this
shift in media tone may simply be because there were only three articles that I coded
from that time period that fit all the criteria outlined in my methods chapter. One example
of a negative article from this time period states,
Not only is Mr. Trump brazenly unrepentant for his attempt to extort Ukraine's
help for his reelection, but also he is likely to take the Senate's vote as vindication
and license for further improper actions. That makes it incumbent upon
responsible members of Congress, Republicans and Democrats alike, to do what
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they can to protect the integrity of the November election, as well as that of the
Constitution (After the Acquittal 2020).
The author clearly believes that Trump did something wrong, and the necessary actions
should be taken to “protect the integrity” of the country and democracy. When looking at
the differences in means for this period, the trends are similar to the previous two time
periods. Again, there is a large gap between Democrats and Republicans, with
significantly more Democrats in favor of Trump’s removal from office. As Figure 4.9
illustrates, the difference of means between Democrats and Republicans is rather
consistent across all three time periods, with the difference being 0.849, and again, taking
up almost the entire scale. This indicates the large difference in opinions between the two
parties when it comes to impeaching Trump. Turning now towards my first hypothesis,
while media coverage was primarily negative towards Trump and Republicans during
this time period, as Figure 4.5 illustrates, there is still a lot to be said about Democrats
and Republicans in relation to my hypotheses. In terms of co-partisans, or Republicans in
this case, regardless of media coverage, they stayed true to their political party, which
speaks to polarization and negative partisanship. Democrats, or opposing partisans, also
stayed true to their party, with the same pro-impeachment views as the media.
With respect to Independents, as Figure 4.9 illustrates, the difference between
Democrats and Independents is 0.387, which is not quite as substantively significant as
the difference between Independents and Republicans. The average Democrat and
Independent are both in support of impeaching Donald Trump. There is a slight increase,
though, in the difference of means between Independents and Democrats, meaning
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slightly fewer Independents supported Trump potentially being removed from office.
Looking at Republicans and Independents, the difference of means is 0.463, which is
statistically significant, and takes up nearly half the scale, showing a pretty significant
difference in opinions between these two parties. Compared to the mean Republican, the
mean Independent is at best ambivalent about impeaching Trump. Again, the difference
in means between Independents and Republicans is a little smaller, as Figure 4.9 shows,
meaning that more Independents are against removing Trump from office. Looking at
Figure 4.5, the majority of media coverage during this time was negative, however, there
were only three articles for this time period. Additionally, the majority of the public, as
Figure 4.6 shows, was in favor of impeaching Trump. Thus, Independents sided with the
majority. However, Independents were slightly more split on the issue than in previous
time periods, as Figure 4.6 illustrates, with slightly over 49% against impeachment, and
slightly over 50% of Independents in favor of impeachment.

Clinton and Trump: A Comparison
In terms of the tone of the news media, there is a vast difference in the way in
which Clinton’s impeachment was viewed, compared to Trump’s. There was a significant
shift in tone, from a rather neutral or positive tone throughout Clinton’s impeachment to
an extremely negative tone throughout Trump’s. This may simply be due to the
increasing levels of polarization in the country, which has been on the rise over the past
several decades. Another potential explanation, which seemed to be a rather common
theme in the articles themselves, was that both Presidents were impeached for very
different reasons. This seemed to be an important factor, particularly in Clinton’s case, as
many of the articles felt that Clinton was in the wrong, but his lies were not classified as
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“high crimes,” and thus did not warrant impeachment. Some articles cited “precedent” as
a reason that Clinton should not have been impeached, as it would significantly lower the
bar for impeachment going forward. In Trump’s case, however, many of the articles
discussed that he did in fact commit “high crimes and misdemeanors” that warranted his
impeachment.
An interesting similarity between the two cases that I noticed when I was
gathering articles was the lack of articles for the final period, after the Senate voted to
acquit both Clinton and Trump. I think this is rather interesting as it almost sends the
message that the media does not care about impeachment, after the Senate has made their
decision. Looking at the Clinton and Trump cases, I found five and three articles to code,
respectively, for the final period. While the polls illustrated that people still have their
opinions at that time, the articles said otherwise. Thus, the media likely moved on to
other salient issues at the time, or rather, began their agenda-setting process immediately
following acquittal.
While both newspapers for both cases had a very small sample of articles in the
time period after the Senate vote, overall, for the Clinton case, there were almost double
the number of articles than in the Trump case. This may be due to several possible
explanations. First, maybe during the Clinton time period, the media played a much
larger role than in the modern age. Therefore, The New York Times and The Washington
Post decided not to cover impeachment as extensively as they did after Trump’s acquittal
as they did after Clinton’s acquittal in 1999. Another potential explanation could be that
during the Clinton era, people felt the media covered impeachment too much. Therefore,
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during the Trump era, the newspapers may have consciously chosen to decrease
impeachment coverage. Third, maybe because Trump portrayed these sources as liberal,
even though they are primarily bipartisan, the two newspapers decided to please their
readers, as because of Trump’s rhetoric, conservatives may have turned away from these
sources. Therefore, Trump may have turned his base away from these sources, making
the sources portray him in this way. Thus, maybe the media focused on reinforcing their
readers existing opinions, rather than trying to please conservatives that are not tuned in
or change opinions of liberal readers. Finally, maybe people already had their minds
made up about Trump, so The Washington Post and The New York Times felt there was
no point in trying to change opinions. Hence, they only covered Trump and Republicans
in a neutral or negative way.
Figure 4.10: Depth of Coverage by Time Period
Clinton
Trump
# of 1s: 7
# of 1s: 2
# of 2s: 12
# of 2s: 6
# of 3s: 17
# of 3s: 11
# of 4s: 14
# of 4s: 11
# of 5s: 6
# of 5s: 5
Period 2
# of 1s: 3
# of 1s: 1
# of 2s: 11
# of 2s: 4
# of 3s: 23
# of 3s: 8
# of 4s: 12
# of 4s: 5
# of 5s: 3
# of 5s: 1
Period 3
# of 1s: 0
# of 1s: 2
# of 2s: 1
# of 2s: 0
# of 3s: 2
# of 3s: 1
# of 4s: 2
# of 4s: 0
# of 5s: 0
# of 5s: 0
Average Score
2.74
3.14
Another similarity between the two cases is the depth of coverage aspect, which
Period 1

measured if the article was more opinion-oriented or political-oriented. This was
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measured on a five- point scale with one being extremely opinionated, and five being
extremely political or constitutional. Similar to how the ANES defines individuals as
“Democrat- leaning” and “Republican- leaning”, on my five point scale, a 2 would be
“opinion- leaning,” while a 4 would be “political/ constitutional leaning.” As illustrated
above in Figure 4.10, the majority of articles fell in the 2-4 range, meaning a pretty equal
mix of politics and constitutional issues, with the author’s opinion on the matter. Because
of this, it is intuitive that coverage would generally be more neutral than positive or
negative leaning. However, in the Clinton era, most coverage was positive, with a
significant amount being neutral. In the Trump era, almost all coverage was negative,
with very limited neutral coverage. The average score for both Clinton and Trump was
about a 3, as Figure 4.10 shows. However, the average score for Clinton was just under a
3, and it was just over for Trump. This means that under Clinton, there were more
opinionated articles, which may have ultimately had more of an effect on public opinion.
Under Trump, there were more articles that focused on the politics of the
impeachment, and/or the constitutional questions it raises, as well as articles that leaned
toward a political or constitutional focus. Because of this, the media may have had less of
an effect as with Clinton, because media coverage was somewhat more fact based. This is
rather surprising, as in terms of the tone, most coverage of Clinton was positive or
neutral, and for Trump, most coverage was negative. Thus, maybe the media is not going
as great of a job of being unbiased when it comes to tone as they are with overall framing
as opinion oriented versus political oriented. It is interesting that in both the Clinton and
Trump cases, the framing of the issue was relatively the same, with a similar focus on
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both opinion and politics, versus one or the other. Additionally, this was consistent across
each time period, with a score of 3 being the modal score.
Figure 4.11: Overall Breakdown of Public Opinion and Feelings Towards
Impeachment- Clinton Period 1

Should be Impeached

Republicans

Democrats

Independents

207

28

105

99

375

267

Should not be
Impeached
With respect to the public opinion polls, it is interesting that in both cases, most
people identified as Republican or Democrat. For example, in the figure above from the
first Clinton time period, 709 respondents identified as either Republican or Democrat,
while only 372 individuals identified as Independent. These patterns are consistent
throughout both cases, and each time period (see Appendix for other examples). This is
rather interesting, as it illustrates the high levels of partisanship and polarization in the
country, two decades apart. Even in the Clinton era, people wanted to choose a side, and
at least according to these specific polls, voted in favor of their side with minor
exceptions. This demonstrates the effects of polarization and negative partisanship, as
each party does not want the other to “win”. For example, in the Clinton era,
Independents sided much more with the media, as when the coverage was positive,
Independents were against impeachment.
However, despite over 80% of coverage being negative during the Trump era,
more Independents sided with Trump and Republicans as time went on and the
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proceedings progressed. Therefore, maybe under Clinton, Independents were swayed by
media coverage, while they were not in the Trump era. So, perhaps, media coverage
mattered more in the later 1990s, but by 2019 and 2020, Independents became less
susceptible to media influence. This may be due to increased polarization, or potentially
fewer true Independents. Individuals may claim that they are Independent, when in
actuality, they lean one way or another. Because of this, they are not true Independents,
and actually vote and act according to the party they lean towards.
Additionally, one important comparison, while not covered extensively in my
research, is the outcome of the House and Senate votes. In the Clinton era, members of
Congress were much more willing to cross party lines and vote against their party with, at
one point, eighty-one House Republicans crossing party lines on the vote to impeach
Clinton. However, in the Trump era, only two House Democrats voted against the first
article of impeachment and three House Democrats voted against the second article.
Everyone else in the Trump case stayed true to their political party. This reinforces the
growing divide in the United States as well as the rising levels of polarization and
negative partisanship. Maybe this is because in the Clinton era, the media had more of an
ability to influence members of Congress, as the media played a larger role in influencing
public opinion at the time. Because members of Congress are focused on re-election, the
media may have indirectly had a greater effect on members of Congress in the Clinton
era than in the Trump era. Thus, the media may have lost their influence to some degree
in a span of twenty years. This may be a result of increasing levels of polarization and
negative partisanship, as the media may believe people no longer care about what they
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think. Maybe the only people that care about the media’s opinion post-Trump are
Independents, and partisans have become so attuned to their own beliefs, that they do not
want another perspective. Perhaps, however, it’s the case that the media has done such a
good job at polarizing people—especially with the rise of a 24/7 news cycle with plenty
of options for selective exposure—that the perception of media influence diminishes
because we don’t see the media’s framing effects on individual issues once the media has
already pushed people to either identify with a party and/or become more entrenched in
their partisan identity.
Finally, with respect to the Trump case, the sample sizes are extremely large for
all three time periods. Because of this, these polls are probably a pretty accurate picture
of public opinion before, during, and after impeachment. While the sample sizes for the
Clinton polls were large enough, it would have been nice to have larger sample sizes as
well. This way, all of my data would be pretty representative of the population. However,
it was probably much easier with all of the technology in the Trump era to survey a larger
group of people.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
This Independent Study explored the media’s influence on public opinion leading
up to, during, and after the impeachment proceedings against former presidents Bill
Clinton and Donald Trump. I identified that because the impeachment of the President
has only occurred four times in the United States3, there is a lack of literature with regard
to impeachment in general. Even when there is academic attention on impeachment, there
is little direct comparison of the more recent impeachments of President Clinton and
President Trump. I identified three hypotheses: among co-partisans, when the media’s
tone is neutral or positive, negative partisanship will manifest as positive attitudes toward
the President and his political party; that among opposing partisans, when the media’s
tone is neutral or positive, negative partisanship result in negative attitudes toward the
President and his political party; among Independents, when the media’s tone is neutral
or positive, evaluations of the President will remain consistent with the general public’s
opinion, which is shaped by the media’s coverage.
In order to explore these hypotheses, I used the comparative case study method,
specifically looking at the Clinton and the first Trump impeachment cases. I chose the
Clinton impeachment and the first Trump impeachment because of their recency and
similar political and technological climates. Due to their recency, data was more
accessible, and because they were only 21 years apart, they were much more comparable
than President Johnson’s impeachment in the 19th century. Finally, because Trump’s

3

During the completion of this study President Donald Trump was impeached a second time on the charge
of inciting insurrection, related to the events that took place at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021.
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second impeachment occurred mid-way through my research, this case was not selected
either.
To examine my research question, I conducted a content analysis of articles
published by The New York Times and The Washington Post before impeachment, during
impeachment, and after the Senate voted on the articles of impeachment to determine
how the media portrayed impeachment. I then conducted differences of means tests using
Gallup and Pew Research Center Polls which corresponded to the three time periods to
determine public opinion at the time. In my analysis section, I compared the results found
in the content analysis with the difference of means tests in order to determine the
media’s effects.
Overall, my difference of means tests were statistically significant across all time
periods for both Clinton and Trump. That is, there were significant differences in the
average level of support for impeachment of each president when comparing selfdescribed Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. In relation to my first hypothesis—
that among co-partisans, when the media’s tone is neutral or positive, negative
partisanship will manifest as positive attitudes toward the President and his political
party— I found this to hold true in the Clinton case. When the media was primarily
neutral or positive towards Clinton and Democrats, Democrats stayed true to their
political party. In terms of Trump, however, media coverage seems to play less of a role.
Despite overwhelmingly negative coverage, Republicans still stood by Trump, and were
against impeachment. This still speaks to the idea of partisanship, as despite the media’s
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negative portrayal of the President, his party was still on his side, regardless of what
others said.
In terms of my second hypothesis, which was that among opposing partisans,
when the media’s tone is neutral or positive, negative partisanship result in negative
attitudes toward the President and his political party, this was also true in the Clinton
case. Despite media coverage being primarily neutral or positive throughout, Republicans
still were in favor of impeaching the President. While with Trump there was no positive
coverage, and the majority of coverage was negative, Democrats still were very much in
favor of impeaching the President, which again speaks to partisanship. Assuming
coverage aligns with party identification, it appears that among partisans media influence
can reinforce views, though the same coverage is unlikely to change partisans’ attitudes.
Given the dynamics observed during Trump’s first impeachment, it seems media
coverage is irrelevant if that coverage goes against party- driven views. For Republicans
the media’s strongly negative coverage of Trump throughout his impeachment, i.e.
coverage that often supported the idea of impeaching Trump and removing him from
office, was irrelevant to their attitudes and their continued support of Trump.
Finally, looking at my final hypothesis, which was that among Independents,
when the media’s tone is neutral or positive, evaluations of the President will remain
consistent with the general public’s opinion, I found this to be true in the Clinton case as
well. Throughout the three time periods, when the coverage was mostly neutral or
positive, the overall trend in public opinion was one of support for Clinton and the
Democratic Party. Independents followed this trend, and on average were very likely to
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oppose Clinton’s impeachment through all stages of the process. In the Trump case,
Independents also followed the general trend— favoring impeachment— in response to
coverage being neutral or negative toward the President at the time. Based on these
results, I would argue that the media has the most influence on Independents. However,
with polarization on the rise, I would argue that the number of true Independents is
significantly decreasing. For example, in the Clinton era, Independents pretty clearly
supported the President. However, looking at Independents in the Trump era, we see
Independents much more split in half regarding support for or against impeachment,
despite negative media coverage. As a result, I would argue that there are fewer true
Independents today than during the Clinton era. In fact, I suspect it is likely that many
“Independents” lean in favor of one party or the other. Thus, going forward, I expect
media coverage to continue to tailor to one party or the other, rather than the Independent
audience. This may have serious implications in the future. For example, if the media
were to continue on this path of favoring one party over the other, the country will
become increasingly polarized. In addition, negative partisanship will increase, as the
media reinforces one party’s beliefs, and downgrades or even attacks the other political
party.

Strengths
This Independent Study is valuable because it explores impeachment through a
different lens, looking at news media and public opinion. To my knowledge, there is little
previous research in the field which looks at these ideas in relation to impeachment.
Thus, my work has the potential to inspire scholars to further explore these themes as
well as impeachment in a broader sense. Additionally, to my knowledge, there was
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limited scholarly work comparing the Trump impeachment to the Clinton impeachment,
which is also explored through this Independent Study. While this may simply be due to
the recency of the 2019 Trump impeachment, my research may inspire others to explore
these similarities and differences between these cases much more in-depth.
Another strength of my thesis is that it combines both qualitative and quantitative
data to gain a complete understanding of the material. The qualitative data from the
newspapers allowed me to gain a full understanding of how the media framed
impeachment in both cases, as well as the tone they used. The quantitative data from the
polls allowed me to gain a snapshot of public opinion at the time. Additionally, the use of
quantitative and qualitative data further illustrates the complexity of the phenomenon of
impeachment.

Weaknesses
There were some limitations to my study that I would like to acknowledge. First,
some of the poll data was difficult to access. For the final Clinton period (post-Senate
vote), I was unable to access poll data in order to conduct a difference of means test.
Additionally, for most other time periods, I was only able to gain access to one poll,
whereas I would have liked to analyze two or three for each time period for both Clinton
and Trump.
Additionally, in terms of the poll data, I think my results would be more
conclusive if the survey sample was the same throughout each time period, at least for
each President individually. This way, the means would be more comparable, as some
sample sizes were significantly larger than the others. Additionally,this study would be
more conclusive if each poll asked the exact same question, as each poll asked about
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impeachment a little bit differently. For example, one poll for the Trump case asked
respondents if his actions were ground for impeachment, while another poll asked what
the outcome of the Senate trial should be, which could have an effect on respondents’
answers.
Finally, in a perfect world, these two cases of impeachment would have occurred
under very similar political climates, with very similar media capabilities. Although it
was only 21 years from Clinton’s impeachment to Trump’s first impeachment, the
political climate has evolved, with a further increases in polarization and negative
partisanship. Additionally, in those 21 years, technology has greatly evolved, as have the
concepts of mass media and social media. In 1998, Twitter did not even exist, however,
Trump relied on Twitter to convey his message throughout his campaign and presidency.
However, because impeachment has only occurred four times, these two cases and
climates were the most similar to study.

Future Research
Going forward, it would be interesting to look at other factors that contribute to
the public’s opinion of the President and how that relates to impeachment and the media.
For example, many people use the economy as a measure of the President’s success, so it
would be interesting to see if that plays a role in the public’s opinion of impeachment.
Second, studying Trump’s second impeachment and seeing how it compares to Clinton’s
impeachment as well as Trump’s first impeachment, is necessary in understanding the
phenomenon. Even since 2019, the country has become increasingly polarized, primarily
because of Trump discrediting the 2020 election and encouraging riots in 2021. While in
2019 and 2021 Trump was impeached for “high crimes and misdemeanors,” the
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impeachments were for different reasons: calling on a foreign power to investigate a
political rival, versus inciting an insurrection in order to prevent the peaceful transfer of
power after the 2020 presidential election. Consequently I would expect the media
coverage from 2019 to 2021 to look slightly different. While no articles that I coded from
2019 were positive towards Trump or the Republican party, I would expect that articles
from 2021 would be even more negative and more in favor of impeachment. This is
because with his second impeachment by the House, there is more clear evidence that he
did in fact encourage an insurrection. Unlike his first impeachment, a handful of
Republicans actually voted for impeaching Trump, which goes against the typical
negative partisanship and polarization in modern America.
Additionally, it would be interesting to see if these results hold in the future, if
other Presidents are impeached down the road. Finally, while I only studied the
impeachment of Presidents, conducting this study or a similar one on other politicians
who have been impeached could also help to provide a complete picture of impeachment
as a political process. For example, in 2010 G. Thomas Porteous Jr., U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana was impeached by the House and was convicted later
that year (“Impeachments of Federal Judges”). It would be interesting to study how the
media portrayed him, and if this played a role in public perceptions. I would argue
however, that media coverage is the only reason that people really care about these nonpresidential impeachments, with the exception of maybe individuals in their district.
However, with these cases, it is also important to consider that these judges are
theoretically nonpartisan, and thus, I would expect public opinion to look a lot more like
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Independents in the Clinton era, where public opinion is more based off of the media
coverage and how the judge is portrayed.
There are also changes in Congress that took place between 2019 and 2021. For
example, in the 117th Congress, the Democratic margin shrank in the House, while the
Republican majority in the Senate disappeared, with Vice President Kamala Harris
becoming the tie-breaker in the Senate. Thus, because of this, this was arguably the most
bipartisan impeachment ever. However, there were some similarities between the two
Congresses. For example, in the 116th Congress, which was in session during Trump’s
first impeachment, Democrats held 281 seats, while Republicans held 254 (“Election
Results, 2020: Comparison of State Delegations to the 116th and 117th Congresses). In the
117th Congress, which was in session during Trump’s second impeachment, Democrats
held 272 seats, compared to Republicans’ 263 (“Election Results, 2020: Comparison of
State Delegations to the 116th and 117th Congresses).

79

Bibliography
Abramowitz, Alan I. 2001. “It’s Monica, Stupid: The Impeachment Controversy and the
1998 Midterm Election.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 26(2): 211–26. doi:
10.2307/440200.
Abramowitz, Alan I., Albert D. Cover, and Helmut Norpoth. 1986. “The President's Party
in Midterm Elections: Going from Bad to Worse.” American Journal of Political
Science 30(3): 562. doi: 10.2307/2111090.
Abramowitz, Alan, and Jennifer McCoy. 2018. “United States: Racial Resentment,
Negative Partisanship, and Polarization in Trump’s America.” The ANNALS of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 681(1): 137–56. doi:
10.1177/0002716218811309.’
Abramowitz, Alan I., and Steven W. Webster. 2018. “Negative Partisanship: Why
Americans Dislike Parties But Behave Like Rabid Partisans.” Political Psychology
39: 119–35. doi: 10.1111/pops.12479.
Abramowitz, Alan I., and Steven W. Webster. 2016. “The Rise of Negative Partisanship
and the Nationalization of U.S. Elections in the 21st Century.” Electoral Studies 41:
12-22. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2015.11.001
Anastasio, Phyllis A., Karen C. Rose, and Judith Chapman. 1999. “Can the Media Create
Public Opinion?” Current Directions in Psychological Science 8(5): 152–55. doi:
10.1111/1467-8721.00036.
After the Acquittal [Editorial]. (2020, February 6). The Washington Post, A20-A20.
Retrieved February 09, 2021, from
https://www.proquest.com/docview/2351292628?accountid=15131.
Bankert, Alexa. 2020. “Negative and Positive Partisanship in the 2016 U.S. Presidential
Elections.” Political Behavior. doi: 10.1007/s11109-020-09599-1.
Barringer, Felicity. 1998. “Circulation Of Papers Rises Slightly, Audit Says.”
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/04/business/circulation-of-papers-rises-slightlyaudit-says.html (October 22, 2020).
Carothers, Thomas, and Andrew O'Donohue. 2019. “The Long Path of Polarization in the
United States.” In Democracies Divided: the Global Challenge of Political
Polarization, Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 65–92.

80

Carroll, Craig, and Maxwell McCombs. 2003. “Agenda- Setting Effects of Business
News on the Public's Images and Opinions About Major Corporations.” Corporate
Reputation Review 6(1): 36–46.
Cohen, Jeffrey E. 2010. “The Declining Audience for News and the New Media Age.”
In Presidency in the Era of 24-Hour News, Princeton University Press. essay, 135–
59.
The Constitutional Test [Editorial]. (1999, January 17). The New York Times, 16-16.
Retrieved February 09, 2021, from
https://www.proquest.com/docview/431116493?accountid=15131.
DeSilver, Drew. 2019. “Clinton's Impeachment Barely Dented His Public Support, and It
Turned off Many Americans.” Pew Research Center.
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/03/clintons-impeachment-barelydented-his-public-support-and-it-turned-off-many-americans/ (February 16, 2020).
Dzhanova, Yelena, and Kevin Breuninger. 2020. “Trump Approval Rating Hits New
High in Gallup Poll, despite Impeachment Trial.” CNBC.
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/04/trump-approval-hits-new-high-in-gallup-polldespite-impeachment.html (March 14, 2020).
“Election Results, 2020: Comparison of State Delegations to the 116th and 117th
Congresses.” Ballotpedia.
https://ballotpedia.org/Election_results,_2020:_Comparison_of_state_delegations_t
o_the_116th_and_117th_Congresses (February 24, 2021).
An Extraordinary Expansion of Power [Editorial]. (2020, January 22). The Washington
Post, A22-A22. Retrieved February 09, 2021, from
https://www.proquest.com/docview/2342937813?accountid=15131.
“Federal Judicial Center.” Impeachments of Federal Judges | Federal Judicial Center.
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/impeachments-federal-judges (March 1, 2021).
Gillon, Steven M.. 2008. The Pact: Bill Clinton, Newt Gingrich, and the Rivalry That
Defined a Generation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gilmour, Jared. 2020. “Does Impeachment Make Presidents More Popular? Trump
Approval Poll Repeats History.” mcclatchydc.
https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/article240000278.html
(March 14, 2020).
Glader, Paul. 2017. “10 Journalism Brands Where You Find Real Facts Rather Than
Alternative Facts.”

81

https://www.forbes.com/sites/berlinschoolofcreativeleadership/2017/02/01/10journalism-brands-where-you-will-find-real-facts-rather-than-alternative-facts/
(October 22, 2020).
Glazier, Rebecca A, and Amber E Boydstun. 2012. “The President, the Press, and the
War: A Tale of Two Framing Agendas.” Political Communication 29(4): 428–46.
doi: 10.1080/10584609.2012.721870.
Goidel, Robert, and Todd Shields. 1994. “The Vanishing Marginals, the Bandwagon, and
the Mass Media.” The Journal of Politics 56(3): 802–10.
Gramlich, John. 2020. “5 Facts about Fox News.” Pew Research Center.
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/08/five-facts-about-fox-news/
(February 24, 2021).
Haynes, Chris, Jennifer Lee Merolla, and Subramanian Karthick Ramakrishnan. 2016.
“Media Framing and Effects on Public Opinion.” In Framing Immigrants: News
Coverage, Public Opinion, and Policy, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 16–
41.
Hird, John A., Annelise Russell, and Maxwell McCombs. 2018. “The Media.” In Policy
Analysis in the United States, Bristol, UK: Policy Press. essay, 265–79.
Hyde, Henry J. 1999. “Actions - H.Res.611 - 105th Congress (1997-1998): Impeaching
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, for High Crimes and
Misdemeanors.” Congress.gov. https://www.congress.gov/bill/105thcongress/house-resolution/611/all-actions?overview=closed&q=%7B%22roll-callvote%22%3A%22all%22%7D (February 7, 2021).
Impeachment and Censure [Editorial]. (1998, December 13). The Washington Post, C06C06. Retrieved February 09, 2021, from
https://www.proquest.com/docview/408418958?accountid=15131.
Implicating the President and His Men [Editorial]. (2019, November 21). The New York
Times, A22-A22. Retrieved February 09, 2021, from
https://www.proquest.com/docview/2316306586?accountid=15131.
Jacobson, Gary C. 1999. “Impeachment Politics in the 1998 Congressional
Elections.” Political Science Quarterly 114(1): 31–51. doi: 10.2307/2657990.
Jacobson, Gary C. 2000. “Public Opinion and the Impeachment of Bill Clinton.” British
Elections & Parties Review 10(1): 1–31. doi: 10.1080/13689880008413034.

82

Jurkowitz, Mark, and Amy Mitchell. 2020. “Views about Ukraine-Impeachment Story
Connect Closely with Where Americans Get Their News.” Pew Research Center's
Journalism Project. https://www.journalism.org/2020/01/24/views-about-ukraineimpeachment-story-connect-closely-with-where-americans-get-their-news/
(February 16, 2020).
Kagay, Michael R. 1999. “Presidential Address: Public Opinion and Polling During
Presidential Scandal and Impeachment.” Public Opinion Quarterly 63(3): 449. doi:
10.1086/297734.
Kilgore, Ed. 2021. “The Timeline for Trump's Second Impeachment Trial.”
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/timeline-trump-second-impeachment.html
(February 24, 2021).
Mason, Lilliana. 2018. Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity. Chicago,
IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection, 2nd ed. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
McCarthy, Justin. 2019. “Trump Approval Inches Up, While Support for Impeachment
Dips.” Gallup.com. https://news.gallup.com/poll/271691/trump-approval-inchessupport-impeachment-dips.aspx (March 14, 2020).
McCombs, Maxwell V. 2020. Setting the Agenda: Mass Media and Public Opinion. S.l.:
Polity Press.
Miller, Arthur H. 1999. “Sex, Politics, and Public Opinion: What Political Scientists
Really Learned from the Clinton-Lewinsky Scandal.” PS: Political Science and
Politics 32(4): 721. doi: 10.2307/420161 (March 5, 2020).
Nadler, Jerrold. 2020. “Actions - H.Res.755 - 116th Congress (2019-2020): Impeaching
Donald John Trump, President of the United States, for High Crimes and
Misdemeanors.” Congress.gov. https://www.congress.gov/bill/116thcongress/house-resolution/755/all-actions?overview=closed&q=%7B%22roll-callvote%22%3A%22all%22%7D (February 7, 2021).
Newport, Frank. 2020. “Impeachment From the American Public's
Perspective.” Gallup.com. https://news.gallup.com/opinion/pollingmatters/284030/impeachment-american-public-perspective.aspx (February 16,
2020).

83

“The Consequences of Coverup.” 2020. The Washington Post: A24–A24.
https://www.proquest.com/docview/2348558723?accountid=15131 (February 4,
2021).
“The Senate Trial.” 1999. The Washington Post: A20–A20.
https://www.proquest.com/docview/408421628?accountid=15131 (February 4,
2021).
“So Far Not So Good.” 1998. The Washington Post: A20–A20.
https://www.proquest.com/docview/408404487?accountid=15131 (February 7,
2021).
Stroud, Natalie Jomini. 2010. “Polarization and Partisan Selective Exposure.” Journal of
Communication 60(3): 556–76. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2010.01497.x.
Sunstein, Cass R. 1998. “Impeaching the President.” University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 147(2): 279–315. doi: 10.2307/3312833.
Sykes, Charles. 2019. “This Impeachment Is Different-and More
Dangerous.” POLITICO.
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2019/12/07/trump-impeachmentamerica-divided-077221 (March 5, 2020).
Watson, Amy. 2019. “Leading Newspapers in the U.S. by Circulation 2019.” Statista.
https://www.statista.com/statistics/184682/us-daily-newspapers-by-circulation/
(April 16, 2020).
Zakrzewski, Cat. 2020. “The Technology 202: What We Learned from the First
Impeachment Trial of the Social Media Era.” The Washington Post.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-technology202/2020/02/06/the-technology-202-what-we-learned-from-the-first-impeachmentof-the-social-media-era/5e3b0f2988e0fa7f825457b5/ (March 5, 2020).
Zaller, John R. 1998. “Monica Lewinsky’s Contribution to Political Science.” PS:
Political Science and Politics 31(2): 182–89. doi: 10.2307/420248.

84

Chapter 6: Appendix
Clinton Period 1 Tables
Impeachment Question:
“Based on what you know at this point, do you think that Bill Clinton should or should
not be
impeached and removed from office?
1 Should be impeached
2 Should not
9 Don’t know/Refused”
Political Party Question:
“In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat or Independent?
1 Republican
2 Democrat
3 Independent
4 No Preference
5 Other
9 Don't know”
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics

In this poll, there were 1,120 observations, including 320 Republicans, 406 Democrats
and 394 Independents. In order to be able to compare these results with my hypotheses, I
created three dummy variables: RepImpeach, DemImpeach and IndImpeach, which took
into account party identity and if they wanted Clinton to be impeached. Thus, the
minimum and maximum were 0 and 1 respectively.
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Table 6.2: Overall Breakdown of Public Opinion and Feelings Towards
Impeachment

The above table illustrates the overall breakdown of views towards impeachment by
political party. For the purposes of my data collection, I dropped responses in which
political party received a 4, 5, or 9, as I am interested in negative partisanship and
polarization. Thus, those that do not identify with one political party or the other, are not
relevant for my study. For this poll, 1, 2, and 3 for political party represented
Republicans, Democrats, and Independents, respectively. In terms of impeachment, 1
stood for in favor of impeachment, 2 was anti-impeachment, and 9 was did not know/
refused. However, in order to conduct my difference of means tests, I recoded the data so
that 1 was in favor of impeachment, and 0 was not in favor of impeachment. Looking at
the data, it is interesting that so many Democrats and the majority of Independents were
against impeachment, while most Republicans were in favor of impeachment.
Table 6.3: Number of Republicans that think Clinton Should be Impeached

This table illustrates the number of Republicans that think Clinton should and should not
be impeached, based on my dummy variable, RepImpeach. In this instance, 1, being
“positive” denotes that Clinton should be impeached, with 207 Republicans thinking this.
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Zero denotes the 113 Republicans that thought Clinton should not have been impeached.
The 800 missing values include those that identify as Democrat or Republican, or didn’t
know/ refused.
Table 6.4: Number of Democrats that think Clinton Should be Impeached

The above table illustrates the number of Democrats that think Clinton should and should
not be impeached, based on my dummy variable, DemImpeach. In this instance, 1, being
“positive” denotes that Clinton should be impeached, with 28 Democrats thinking this.
Zero denotes the 378 Democrats that thought Clinton should not be impeached. The 714
missing values include Republicans and Independents, or didn’t know/ refused.
Table 6.5: Number of Independents that think Clinton Should be Impeached

This table illustrates the number of Independents that think Clinton should and should not
be impeached, based on my dummy variable, IndImpeach. In this instance, 1, being
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“positive” denotes that Clinton should be impeached, with 105 Independents thinking
this. Zero denotes the 289 Independents that thought Clinton should not be impeached.
The 726 missing values are Democrats or Republicans, or didn’t know/ refused.
Table 6.6: Difference of Means Test- Republicans and Democrats

As shown in Table 6.6, there is a mean difference of 0.5779095. Thus, because the mean
of RepImpeach is greater than the mean of DemImpeach, more Republicans wanted
Clinton impeached than Democrats, with a statistically significant increase of 0.5779095
(95% CI, 0.5235949 to 0.6322241), t(724)= 20.8890, p< 0.05. Not only is this difference
statistically significant, but there is a substantive difference between the two means.
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Table 6.7: Difference of Means Tests- Independents and Democrats

As shown in Table 6.7, there is a mean difference of 0.1975319. Thus, because the mean
of IndImpeach is greater than the mean of DemImpeach, more Independents wanted
Clinton impeached than Democrats, with a statistically significant increase of 0.1975319
(95% CI, 0.1476388 to 0.2474251), t(798)= 7.7715, p< 0.05. While this difference is
statistically significant, it not substantively different, as the difference between the means
is relatively small. However, this is on the right track statistically in terms of my
hypothesis, as I predicted that Independents would side with the majority.
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Table 6.8: Difference of Means Tests- Independents and Republicans

As shown in Table 6.8, there is a mean difference of 0.3803775. Thus, because the mean
of RepImpeach is greater than the mean of IndImpeach, more Republicans wanted
Clinton impeached than Independents, with a statistically significant increase of
0.3803775 (95% CI, 0.3125377 to 0.4482173), t(712)= 11.0082, p< 0.05. This difference
of means is statistically significant, but not substantively different.

Clinton Period 2 Tables
Impeachment Question:
“As you may know, removing a president from office involves two major steps in
Congress. First, the House of Representatives must vote on whether there is enough
evidence to bring a president to trial before the Senate. This step is called impeachment.
Next, the Senate must vote on whether to remove the president from office, or not.
As you may know, the House has now impeached Clinton and the case has been sent to
the Senate for trial. What do you want YOUR Senators to do -- [FORM A: READ 1-2;
FORM B: READ 2-1]? (6/21)
1 Vote in favor of convicting Clinton and removing him from office
2 Vote against convicting Clinton so he will remain in office
3 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED”
Political Party Question:
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“In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat or an
Independent?
(5/18)
1 Republican
2 Democrat
3 Independent
4 OTHER PARTY
5 DON'T KNOW/REFUSED”
Table 6.9: Descriptive Statistics

In this poll, there were 986 observations, including 278 Republicans, 332 Democrats, 376
Independents. In order to be able to compare these results with my hypotheses, I created
three dummy variables: RepRemove, DemRemove and IndRemove, which took into
account party identity and if they wanted Clinton to be removed from office. Thus, the
minimum and maximum were 0 and 1 respectively.
Table 6.10: Overall Breakdown of Public Opinion and Impeachment

The above table illustrates the overall breakdown of views towards removal from office
by political party. For the purposes of my data collection, I dropped responses in which
political party received a 4, or 5, as I am interested in negative partisanship and
polarization. Thus, those that do not identify with one political party or the other, are not
relevant for my study. For this poll, 1, 2, and 3 for political party represented
Republicans, Democrats, and Independents, respectively. In terms of impeachment, 1
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stood for in favor of removal, 2 was anti-removal, and 9 was did not know/ refused.
Looking at the data, it is interesting that so many Democrats and the majority of
Independents were against removal from office, while most Republicans were in favor of
removal. It is important to note for the difference of means tests, that I recoded the data
so that 1 represented in favor of removal, and 0 was not in favor of removal.
Table 6.11: Number of Republicans that think Clinton Should be Removed

This table illustrates the number of Republicans that think Clinton should or should not
be removed, based on my dummy variable, RepRemove. In this instance, 1, being
“positive” denotes that Clinton should be removed from office, with 199 Republicans
thinking this. Zero denotes the 79 Republicans that did not think Clinton should be
removed from office. The 708 missing values include Democrats or Independents.
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Table 6.12: Number of Democrats that think Clinton Should be Removed

The above table shows the number of Democrats that think Clinton should or should not
be removed from office, based on my dummy variable, DemRemove. In this instance, 1,
being “positive” denotes that Clinton should be removed from office, with 36 Democrats
thinking this. Zero denotes the other 296 Democrats, who did not think Clinton should be
removed from office. The 654 missing values include Republicans and Independents.
Table 6.13: Number of Independents that think Clinton Should be Removed

This table illustrates the number of Independents that thought Clinton should or should
not be removed from office, based on my dummy variable, IndRemove. In this instance,
1, being “positive” denotes that Clinton should be removed, with 127 Independents
thinking this. Zero denotes the 249 Independents that did not think Clinton should be
removed from office. The 610 missing values include Republicans and Democrats.
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Table 6.14: Difference of Means Test- Republicans and Democrats

As shown in Table 6.14, there is a mean difference of 0.6073936. Thus, because the mean
of RepRemove is greater than the mean of DemRemove, more Republicans wanted
Clinton removed than Democrats, with a statistically significant increase of 0.6073936
(95% CI, 0.5464306 to 0.6683566), t(608)= 19.5667, p< 0.05. Not only is the difference
between the two means statistically significant, but it is substantively different as well.

94

Table 6.15: Difference of Means Tests- Independents and Democrats

As shown in Table 6.15, there is a mean difference of 0.2293322. Thus, because the mean
of IndRemove is greater than the mean of DemRemove, more Republicans wanted
Clinton removed than Democrats, with a statistically significant increase of 0.2293322
(95% CI, 0.1693465 to 0.2893179), t(706)= 7.5060, p< 0.05. This difference is not
substantively different, as the difference of means is relatively small, but it is statistically
significant. Assuming media coverage matches up with this, it is in favor of my
hypotheses as I expected Independents to go along with the majority.
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Table 6.16: Difference of Means Tests- Independents and Republicans

As shown in Table 6.16, there is a mean difference of 0.3780614. Thus, because the mean
of RepRemove is greater than the mean of IndRemove, more Republicans wanted Clinton
removed than Independents, with a statistically significant increase of 0.3780614 (95%
CI, 0.3059207 to 0.450202), t(652)= 10.2905, p< 0.05. This difference of means is both
statistically significant, but not extremely different.

Trump Period 1 Tables
Impeachment Question:
“Regardless of your view of the House of Representatives’ decision to conduct an
inquiry... Do you think Donald Trump has done things that are grounds for his
impeachment?
1 Definitely
2 Probably
3 Probably not
4 Definitely not”
Political Party Question:
“In politics today, do you consider yourself a…
1 Republican
2 Democrat
3 Independent
4 Something else”
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Table 6.17: Descriptive Statistics

There were 3,137 observations in this poll, including 892 Republicans, 1,320 Democrats,
and 925 Independents. In order to be able to compare these results with my hypotheses, I
created three dummy variables: RepGImpeach, DemGImpeach and IndGImpeach, which
took into account party identity and if they believed Trump’s actions were grounds for
impeachment. Thus, the minimum and maximum were 0 and 1 respectively.
Table 6.18: Overall Breakdown of Public Opinion and Impeachment

The above table illustrates the overall breakdown of views towards impeachment by
political party. For the purposes of my data collection, I dropped responses in which
political party received a 4, as I am interested in negative partisanship and polarization.
Thus, those that do not identify with one political party or the other, are not relevant for
my study. For this poll, I recoded that data, so that 1 represents grounds for removal,
while 0 represents those that do not think Trump’s actions were grounds for removal.
Looking at the data, it is interesting that so many Democrats were in favor of removing
Trump from office, as well as the majority of Independents. Additionally, most
Republicans were against impeachment.

97

Table 6.19: Number of Republicans that think Trump Should be Impeached

This table illustrates the number of Republicans that think Trump’s actions were grounds
for impeachment, based on my dummy variable, RepGImpeach. In this instance, 1, being
“positive” denotes that Trump’s actions were ground for impeachment, with 95
Republicans thinking this. Zero denotes the 797 Republicans that did not think Trump’s
actions were grounds for impeachment. The 2,245 missing values are either Democrats or
Independents.
Table 6.20: Number of Democrats that think Trump Should be Impeached

The above table shows the number of Democrats that think Trump’s actions were
grounds for impeachment, based on my dummy variable, DemGImpeach. In this
instance, 1, being “positive” denotes that Trump’s actions were ground for impeachment,
with 1,272 Democrats thinking this. Zero denotes the 48 Democrats that did not think
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Trump’s actions were grounds for impeachment. The 1,817 missing values are either
Republicans or Independents.
Table 6.21: Number of Independents that think Trump Should be Impeached

This table shows the number of Independents that think Trump’s actions were grounds
for impeachment, based on my dummy variable, IndGImpeach. In this instance, 1, being
“positive” denotes that Trump’s actions were ground for impeachment, with 577
Independents thinking this. Zero denotes the 348 Independents that did not think Trump’s
actions were grounds for impeachment. Republicans and Independents make up the 2,212
missing values.
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Table 6.22: Difference of Means Test- Republicans and Democrats

As shown in Table 6.22, there is a mean difference of 0.8571341. Thus, because the mean
of DemGImpeach is greater than the mean of RepGImpeach, more Democrats thought
Trump should be impeached than Republicans, with a statistically significant increase of
0.8571341 (95% CI, 0.8364291 to 0.8778391), t(2210)= 81.1819, p< 0.05. This
difference of means is extremely different, with almost all Democrats in favor of
impeaching Trump, and a very small number of Republicans in favor of impeachment.
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Table 6.23: Difference of Means Tests- Independents and Democrats

As shown in Table 6.23, there is a mean difference of 0.3398526. Thus, because the mean
of DemGImpeach is greater than the mean of IndGImpeach, more Democrats thought
Trump should be impeached than Independents, with a statistically significant increase of
0.3398526 (95% CI, 0.3110408 to 0.3686643), t(2243)= 23.1315, p< 0.05. This
difference of means is not substantively different, however, statistically, this is on the
right track of my hypotheses, as Independents are not far off of Democrats, which was
the general consensus at the time.
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Table 6.24: Difference of Means Tests- Independents and Republicans

As shown in Table 6.24, there is a mean difference of 0.5172815. Thus, because the mean
of IndGImpeach is greater than the mean of RepGImpeach, more Independents thought
Trump should be impeached than Republicans, with a statistically significant increase of
0.5172815 (95% CI, 0.4797412 to 0.5548218), t(1815)= 27.0251, p< 0.05. This
difference is both substantively different as well as statistically significant, and thus far,
matches my hypotheses for Independents.

Trump Period 2 Tables
Impeachment Question:
“What do you think the outcome of a Senate impeachment trial should be?
[RANDOMIZE]
1 Donald Trump should stay in office
2 Donald Trump should be removed from office”
Political Party Question:
“In politics today, do you consider yourself a…
1 Republican
2 Democrat
3 Independent
4 Something else”
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Table 6.25: Descriptive Statistics

There were 11,111 observations in this poll, including 3,102 Republicans, 4,372
Democrats, and 3,637 Independents. In order to be able to compare these results with my
hypotheses, I created three dummy variables: RepRemove, DemRemove, and
IndRemove, which took into account party identity and if they believed Trump should be
removed from office. Thus, the minimum and maximum were 0 and 1 respectively.
Table 6.26: Overall Breakdown of Public Opinion and Impeachment

The above table illustrates the overall breakdown of views towards removal from office
by political party. For the purposes of my data collection, I dropped responses in which
political party received a 4, as I am interested in negative partisanship and polarization.
Thus, those that do not identify with one political party or the other, are not relevant for
my study. For this poll, 1, 2, and 3 for political party represented Republicans,
Democrats, and Independents, respectively. Looking at the data, it is interesting that so
many Republicans were against impeachment, while most Democrats and Independents
were in favor of impeachment. However, Independents just barely favored impeachment,
which is important to notice. For the purposes of my data collection, I recoded the data so
that 1 represented in favor of removal and 0 represented not in favor of removal.
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Table 6.27: Number of Republicans that think Trump Should be Removed

This table shows the number of Republicans that think Trump should or should not have
been removed from office, based on my dummy variable, RepRemove. In this instance, 1,
being “positive” denotes that Trump should be removed, with 169 Republicans thinking
this. Zero denotes the 2,933 Republicans that do not think Trump should be removed.
The remaining 8,009 missing values were those that identify as Democrat or Independent.
Table 6.28: Number of Democrats that think Trump Should be Removed

The above table illustrates the number of Democrats that think Trump should have been
removed from office, based on my dummy variable, DemRemove. In this instance, 1,
being “positive” denotes that Trump should be removed, with 3,953 Republicans thinking
this. Zero denotes the 419 Democrats that do not think Trump should be removed. The
6,739 missing values are either Republicans or Independents.
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Table 6.29: Number of Independents that think Trump Should be Removed

This table illustrates the number of Independents that think Trump should have been
removed from office, based on my dummy variable, IndRemove. In this instance, 1,
being “positive” denotes that Trump should be removed, with 1,973 Independents
thinking this. Zero denotes the other 1,664 Independents that did not think Trump should
be removed. Republicans and Democrats make up the 7,474 missing values.
Table 6.30: Difference of Means Test- Republicans and Democrats

As shown in Table 6.30 there is a mean difference of 0.8496819. Thus, because the mean
of DemRemove is greater than the mean of RepRemove, more Democrats thought Trump
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should be impeached than Republicans, with a statistically significant increase of
0.8496819 (95% CI, 0.8373263 to 0.8620375), t(7472)= 134.8066, p< 0.05. Not only is
this statistically significant, but it is substantively different.
Table 6.31: Difference of Means Tests- Independents and Democrats

As shown in Table 6.31, there is a mean difference of 0.3616828. Thus, because the mean
of DemRemove is greater than the mean of IndRemove, more Democrats thought Trump
should be impeached than Independents, with a statistically significant increase of
0.3616828 (95% CI, 0.3440825 to 0.3792831), t(8007)= 40.2829, p< 0.05. While this
difference is only statistically significant, it is on track for my hypotheses to be correct,
assuming media coverage matches.
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Table 6.32: Difference of Means Tests- Independents and Republicans

As shown in Table 6.32, there is a mean difference of 0.4879991. Thus, because the mean
of IndRemove is greater than the mean of RepRemove, more Independents thought
Trump should be impeached than Republicans, with a statistically significant increase of
0.4879991 (95% CI, 0.4689726 to 0.5070256), t(6737)= 50.2790, p< 0.05. This
difference is extremely close to 0.5, meaning it is rather different, although not extremely
different.

Trump Period 3 Tables
Impeachment Question:
Regardless of your views about the outcome of the impeachment trial, which comes
closest to your view of Donald Trump’s conduct and the evidence presented against him
in the impeachment trial? [RANDOMIZE ORDER 1-3 AND 3-1]
1 Trump did something wrong, and it was enough to justify his removal from office
2 Trump did something wrong, but it was NOT enough to justify his removal from
office 3 Trump did nothing wrong
Political Party Question:
“In politics today, do you consider yourself a…
1 Republican
2 Democrat
3 Independent
4 Something else”
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Table 6.33: Descriptive Statistics

In this poll, there were 9,156 observations, including 2,529 Republicans, 3,643
Democrats, and 2,984 Independents. In order to be able to compare these results with my
hypotheses, I created three dummy variables: RepRemove, DemRemove, and
IndRemove, which took into account party identity and if they believed Trump should be
removed from office. Thus, the minimum and maximum were 0 and 1 respectively.
Table 6.34: Overall Breakdown of Public Opinion and Impeachment

The above table illustrates the overall breakdown of views towards impeachment by
political party. For the purposes of my data collection, I dropped responses in which
political party received a 4, as I am interested in negative partisanship and polarization.
Thus, those that do not identify with one political party or the other, are not relevant for
my study. For this poll, I recoded the data, so that 0 represents anti-removal from office,
while 1 represents in favor of removal from office. Looking at the data, it is important to
note that overwhelmingly, Republicans were against removal from office. On the other
hand, Democrats were overwhelmingly in favor of removal from office. However,
Independents were pretty split, with the majority siding with Democrats.
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Table 6.35: Number of Republicans that think Trump Should be Removed

This table shows the number of Republicans that think Trump should have been removed
from office, based on my dummy variable, RepRemove. In this instance, 1, being
“positive” denotes that Trump should be removed, with 109 Republicans thinking this.
Zero denotes the 2,420 Republicans that did not think Trump should be removed. The
6,627 missing values are Democrats and Independents.
Table 6.36: Number of Democrats that think Trump Should be Removed

Illustrated above is the number of Democrats that think Trump should have been
removed from office, based on my dummy variable, DemRemove. In this instance, 1,
being “positive” denotes that Trump should be removed, with 3,251 Democrats thinking
this. Zero denotes the 392 Democrats that did not think Trump should be removed. The
5,513 missing values are Republicans or Independents.
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Table 6.37: Number of Independents that think Trump Should be Removed

The above table shows the number of Independents that think Trump should have been
removed from office, based on my dummy variable, IndRemove. In this instance, 1,
being “positive” denotes that Trump should be removed, with 1,509 Independents
thinking this. Zero denotes the 1,475 Independents that did not think Trump should be
removed. The 6,172 missing values are Republicans and Democrats.
Table 6.38: Difference of Means Test- Republicans and Democrats

As shown in Table 6.38, there is a mean difference of 0.8492963. Thus, because the mean
of DemRemove is greater than the mean of RepRemove, more Democrats thought Trump
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should be impeached than Republicans, with a statistically significant increase of
0.8492963 (95% CI, 0.835531 to 0.8630616), t(6170)= 120.9503, p< 0.05. This
difference of means is both statistically significant as well as substantively different.
Table 6.39: Difference of Means Tests- Independents and Democrats

As shown in Table 6.39, there is a mean difference of 0.3866993. Thus, because the mean
of DemRemove is greater than the mean of IndRemove, more Democrats thought Trump
should be impeached than Independents, with a statistically significant increase of
0.3866993 (95% CI, 0.3670153 to 0.4063834), t(6625)= 38.5112, p< 0.05. While this
difference of means is not substantively different, statistically it matches my hypotheses,
assuming media coverage aligns with this as well.
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Table 6.40: Difference of Means Tests- Independents and Republicans

As shown in Table 6.40, there is a mean difference of 0.462597. Thus, because the mean
of IndRemove is greater than the mean of RepRemove, more Independents thought
Trump should be impeached than Republicans, with a statistically significant increase of
0.462597 (95% CI, 0.4417852 to 0.4834088), t(5511)= 43.5749, p< 0.05. While this is
not extremely different, it is pretty close to 0.5, making it a pretty significant difference
of means.
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Coding Instructions
1. Opinion vs. Political Piece
An article can be either an opinion or political piece, or both an opinion and political
piece. As long as the article provides the author’s opinion regarding impeachment and/or
the politics of impeachment, it receives a 1 for the category which it falls in. In cases
where the article is both opinion and political, assign each category a 1, regardless of if
one is more dominant than the other.
2. Tone
Positive articles – anti-impeachment of either President Clinton or President Trump,
positive perceptions of the President or the President’s party
Negative articles – pro-impeachment of either President Clinton or President Trump,
negative perceptions of the President or the President’s party
3. Salience
If the article is on the front page of the newspaper, it is assigned 1. If it appears
elsewhere, 0 is assigned. However, because these sources are electronic, it may be
difficult to tell what page the article is on, so leave the salience blank.
4. Depth of Coverage
If the article is more about impeachment as a political process, the article should receive a
5. If the article is more about the author’s opinion on the validity of the charges, and not
about the political process, it gets coded as a 1 (more of an op-ed). For articles that focus
on both the political aspect and the author’s personal opinion, the article receives a 3
(more of an editorial).
Sample Positive Article Coding Sheet
Article #: 94
Date Published: 1/8/1999 (Clinton Period 2)
Newspaper: The Washington Post
Type of Article: Editorial
Word Count: 523
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Political piece?

Yes (1)
Yes (1)
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positive (+)
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1 (opinion oriented)
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“THE SENATE trial of President Clinton began yesterday amid continued confusion
over the sort of format that would govern it. The White House and Senate Democrats are
seeking a procedure that would prevent the calling of witnesses before an early vote on
whether a full trial should take place at all. The House impeachment managers and many
Senate Republicans, meanwhile, are insisting on a fuller trial that would include
witnesses. The partisan lines that are forming early around these procedural questions are
dispiriting, although last night Senate leaders still held out hope of a compromise. Still,
the reality is that both sides raise real concerns that, if unaddressed, could undermine the
ultimate legitimacy of whatever the Senate finally achieves.
Those who favor calling witnesses argue accurately that the Senate owes the House of
Representatives the respect of considering seriously the articles of impeachment it has
sent over. The House, in our opinion, erred in its decision to impeach Mr. Clinton. But an
impeachment by the House demands of the Senate a proceeding of sufficient rigor to
satisfy the more moderate of Mr. Clinton's political foes -- should the president ultimately
be acquitted -- that the Senate, at the least, did not shirk its obligation to face up to his
odious conduct. For this reason, House managers should be given an opportunity to
present senators with the case against Mr. Clinton in a manner that does not trivialize his
behavior by trivializing its presentation. While we believe that the allegations against Mr.
Clinton -- even if proven -- should not trigger his removal, many people legitimately
disagree with this view. The facts that could be developed more fully at trial are,
therefore, no mere sideshow. As long as a majority of senators believe that additional
testimony is necessary in order to inform their final votes, it seems reasonable to permit
whatever witnesses the House wishes to call. (Mr. Clinton's lawyers, of course, must have
the opportunity fully to cross-examine any witnesses who do appear.)
But this does not mean the Senate should hear lots of testimony that, while embarrassing
to the president, is not necessary in order to inform its final judgment. Just as the trial's
legitimacy depends on whether senators give a fair hearing to the House, it also depends
on whether they refrain from dragging out the trial in order to beat up on the president for
political reasons. The Senate can and should end the trial as soon as a majority of
senators become convinced that hearing from more witnesses will not aid them in their
determinations of how to vote.
The search for an adequate trial procedure is proving divisive, but the animating principle
that would guide a good Senate trial is hardly subtle. The Senate trial, whatever
procedure it uses, will be seen as legitimate if senators end up hearing the House's case
adequately to make an informed judgment on its merits without letting partisan concerns
-- or, for that matter, concerns about convenience to the Senate or the country at large -artificially lengthen or shorten its deliberation” (The Senate Trial, 1999).
Sample Neutral Article Coding Sheet
Article #: 56
Date Published: 9/21/1998 (Clinton Period 1)
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Newspaper: The Washington Post
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Word Count: 646
Opinion piece?
Political piece?

Yes (1)
Yes (1)

No (0)
No (0)

Tone of Article:

positive (+)

negative (-)

neutral (+/-)

Salience/Placement of Article: 0 (not front page)

1 (front page)

Depth of Coverage:

3

1 (opinion oriented)

2

4

5 (political process)

The Article:
“THE IMPEACHMENT process on which the House is now embarked can never be
divorced entirely from partisan political considerations. But it ought not be an exercise in
naivete to urge the leadership of both parties to try. The credibility of the proceedings,
and thus their ultimate worth, will depend not just on whether they are fair but on
whether they are perceived as having been so.
The Republicans bear the larger share of this responsibility because it is they -- in
particular House Speaker Newt Gingrich -- who are in control. The responsibility is the
greater because of the impact the proceedings may have on the November elections, and
the fact that those in turn could affect control of Congress and national policy for years to
come. The Republicans have no obligation to shield the Democrats from the possible
electoral consequences of the president's challenged behavior. But it is their
responsibility not to twist the proceedings to accentuate that fallout. Their own long-term
reputations are at stake in this, no less than Mr. Clinton's.
The proceedings thus far in the Judiciary Committee seem to us to fall short of this latter
standard. We have no way of gauging whether the committee Republicans were right or
wrong in deciding as they did to release today the videotape of the president's grand jury
testimony and 2,800 other pages of evidence; we haven't seen any of it. Our instinct is to
favor disclosure, and the committee's earlier decision to release the full report of
independent counsel Kenneth Starr was absolutely correct. But the committee has a duty
to function as something more than a conduit between Mr. Starr and the Internet. Is its
only intention before the election to make available the prosecutor's brief? Committee
Democrats said the release of the new material was piling on, that a transcript would have
done just as well as the videotape and been less susceptible to use in campaign ads -quite true -- and that material in the 2,800 pages should have been cut. The Judiciary
Democrats are themselves a partisan group with an interest to protect, and they inspire no
automatic confidence. But the committee Republicans who smirked afterward that they
were just trying to keep the public informed inspired none either.
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These are not court proceedings. The only real check against abuse is thus the
committee's own discretion, which is to say, the discretion of the leadership to which the
committee, on the Republican side particularly, seems wont to respond. The thing needs
to be done better -- on a more principled and deliberate basis -- than it seems to us to
have been done thus far. There needs to be some agreement between the parties on the
process to be followed in the inquiry. The Democrats must seek to be something more
than a bloc of objectors; the Republicans need to find a way to avoid the kind of partyline majoritarianism that distinguished last week's deliberations.
The Republicans have let at least two investigations of administration conduct in recent
years degenerate into inconclusive name-calling contests. This one is too important to be
allowed to go down the same path. After Richard Nixon's resignation, the House voted
with only a few dissenters to accept the impeachment report of the Judiciary Committee
and to commend the committee for the manner in which it had conducted its
impeachment inquiry. That is the kind of bipartisan respect to which the committee again
must aspire. Here's a test. Each time the committee acts, members of both parties -- and
the rest of us -- should ask the question: Would they have done the same thing if Mr.
Clinton were a Republican president? If the answer is no, as it almost surely was last
week, they need to go back to the drawing board” (So Far, Not So Good 1998).
Sample Negative Article Coding Sheet
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The Article:
“SENATORS FACE a historic decision Friday: whether to shut down the trial of
President Trump without hearing what they know would be essential evidence. Mr.
Trump has denied for months that he withheld military aid and a White House meeting
from Ukraine's president in an effort to force politicized investigations, including of
former vice president Joe Biden. The president's lawyers have insisted that there is no
firsthand testimony to the contrary. Yet, now, senators know that former national security
adviser John Bolton can supply that testimony and that he is prepared to appear if called.
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Polls show that Americans overwhelmingly want the senators to hear witnesses. There is
no precedent for an impeachment trial without testimony. If the Senate refuses, it will
ratify a coverup, making any acquittal of Mr. Trump meaningless.
Mr. Bolton is not the only witness who could enlighten the Senate, and the country, about
the Ukraine affair. Acting White House chief of staff Mick Mulvaney also has direct
knowledge of Mr.-Trump's intention in withholding the Ukraine aid. Vice President
Pence knows why Mr. Trump suddenly ordered him not to attend the inauguration of
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky last May. Rudolph W. Giuliani, the president's
personal lawyer, and his former sidekicks Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman know in detail
how Mr. Zelensky and his top aides were pressured. Republicans argue that an attempt to
subpoena Mr. Bolton or other witnesses would lead to court battles with the White House
‘even as they fault the House for not undertaking the same fight. One of the president's
lawyers has advanced the extraordinary defense that Mr. Trump was entitled to trade
official acts for help with his reelection’ a position, that, if ratified, would grant Mr.
Trump and future Presidents’ vast powers to rig elections.
GOP leaders vow that if the Senate votes to call witnesses, they will move to summon
Mr. Biden, his son Hunter and others. That would be shameful: By forcing the Bidens to
testify, senators would be handing Mr. Trump what he was seeking all along, the chance
to sow bogus questions about the probity of a leading Democratic presidential candidate.
Democrats, however, should not be intimidated by this threat into backing away from the
demand that Mr. Bolton and other relevant witnesses appear.
Ironically, senators who support a coverup now will only limit their acceptable options as
the trial ends. Serious arguments have been made against conviction. One is that, because
the president's extortion scheme never bore fruit ‘no investigations were announced, and
U.S. aid was eventually delivered’ removal from office is an excessive remedy. Another
is that a verdict on Mr. Trump's tenure should be rendered by voters nine months from
now.
But if Republicans muzzle potential witnesses and suppress relevant documents, senators
who respect the Constitution will be left with only one honorable choice. Mr. Trump tried
to use his office to force Ukraine to intervene in the 2020 election. He and his lawyers
have not only refused to admit wrongdoing but have brazenly asserted the president's
right to engage in such manipulations. If that proposition is the one to be decided, and
what should be a full and fair trial is aborted on the president's orders, the only justifiable
vote will be for conviction” (The Consequences of Coverup, 2020).
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